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L. I. BREZHNEV'S ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM PRAVDA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 p 3

[Reprint of 21 October 1981 PRAVDA interview of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium]

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OUTLINES OF U.S. MILITARY-POLITICAL STRATEGY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 4-16

[Article by V. V. Zhurkin]

[Text] The Republican Administration's military-political strategy is acquiring increasingly visible outlines. It is based upon the intention to achieve military superiority to the Soviet Union and to build up nuclear and conventional potential thereby hazardously escalating the danger of war. Washington's current strategists are also making every effort to surpass their Democratic predecessors in the military sphere and to intensify the new round of the arms race they initiated.

In addition to all this, there is the unrestrained growth of military appropriations, which were already inordinately high. During the current 5 years the Reagan Administration intends to bring the total up to 1,488,001,000,000 dollars, or 187.4 billion more dollars than Carter requested before he left the White House. What are the goals of this new round of the arms race?

Real and Imaginary Goals

In an attempt to justify the frenzied outburst of military activity, administration spokesmen sometimes set forth arguments that are contradictory but actually have the same propagandistic core: As soon as the Soviet Union, they assert, achieved strategic parity with the United States (reinforced by the approximate equivalence of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces), it began a constant advance toward military superiority to the United States and has supposedly already achieved this superiority in some areas. The new U.S. re-arming program is being carried out on the pretext of neutralizing this "superiority."

Actually, however, the Soviet Union has repeatedly stressed that it has never striven for superiority and is not striving for it now. These statements have been corroborated by the Soviet Union's actual foreign and military policy.

The existence of an approximate balance between Soviet and U.S. strategic forces has been acknowledged by authoritative experts in the West.

At the time when the SALT II treaty was concluded, L. I. Brezhnev noted in response to the question of editors of West Germany's DER SPIEGEL, the Soviet Union had more carriers but the United States had the advantage in terms of warheads. Nevertheless, the USSR agreed to reduce the number of carriers of strategic

weapons by approximately 10 percent, or by 254 units, if the treaty should go into effect. Therefore, the treaty envisaged Soviet-U.S. parity in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons.¹

There are also no grounds for the allegations that although an approximate balance exists at the present time, the United States will begin to "lag behind" at some time in the 1980's. The new American strategic programs (the MX, the Trident, the new B-1 heavy bomber and the cruise missile) are eventually supposed to increase the number of intercontinental vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons and, in particular, the number of nuclear warheads. And this is being done at a time when the Soviet Union is being opposed by the strategic forces of all of the other nuclear powers which are either military allies of the United States or are bound to it by some other kind of alliance.

There is also an approximate balance in medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. NATO has around 1,000 medium-range carriers there, most of them American. They include the American missile aviation in Europe (F-111, F-4) the FB-111 medium bombers equipped with nuclear weapons and planes on aircraft carriers (A-6, A-7) as well as English (Polaris) and French (M-20, C-2, C-3) missiles and the missile-carrying bomber aviation of the United States' allies. The Soviet Union has 975 weapons of this type. The situation did not change even after the USSR began to replace its older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the more modern SS-20 missile. When the USSR arms itself with a new missile, it withdraws one or two old ones and scraps them along with their launching devices.²

There is also a balance in the number of armed forces and other categories of weapons (combined). According to the estimates of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, there has long been an approximate balance between Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces with a slight advantage on NATO's side.³ The annual report of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (January 1981) noted that NATO has almost twice the naval tonnage as the Warsaw Pact countries and has a strong advantage in the number of major naval vessels. Comparisons of this kind could also be cited for many other indicators.

The Soviet Union is guarding this military-strategic parity and is not striving for military superiority, but it will not allow the other side to tip the balance either. The USSR is in favor of preserving this balance in the process of lowering the level of confrontation and of limiting and reducing weapons. This view has been repeatedly expressed by Soviet leaders.

The question of whether there will or will not be a military-strategic balance between the socialist and capitalist worlds is now of fundamental importance. Furthermore, the answer to this question no longer depends on only one side. Experience has shown that the other side is capable of countering any attempt to disrupt the balance. It is important for everyone to realize this.

Nevertheless, discussions about the need for, and possibility of, U.S. military-strategic superiority are still brought up in newspapers and magazines and are heard in speeches by some administration spokesmen, sometimes even those on the very highest levels. The press has reported that Pentagon chief C. Weinberger has submitted a plan to the President aimed at the achievement of nuclear superiority to the USSR within the current decade.⁴ Secretary of the Navy J. Lehman

called "naval superiority a national goal" of the United States,⁵ and C. Gray, Hudson Institute Director of National Security Research, and C. Payne, researcher from the same institute, went even further in their military enthusiasm: "The United States must compile a plan for destroying the Soviet Union at a cost which will not preclude the possibility of U.S. recovery. Washington must define its military priorities in such a way that they ultimately envisage the obliteration of Soviet political power and the rise of a postwar world order meeting Western criteria."⁶ In the press, NSC staff member R. Pipes preached "the inevitability of war if the Soviet Union does not give up communism."⁷

The basic elements of the present administration's military-political doctrine are taking shape in this atmosphere of militaristic passion and neurosis.

Outlines of Strategy

The outlines of current U.S. strategy stem largely from the military-political strategy of the previous, Democratic Administration. We should recall that in the past, the Republicans have been more likely to strive for some economy in military spending, for the concentration of efforts in what they regard as the most important spheres, primarily nuclear. One of the distinctive features of the traditional Democratic line (although it was not always displayed in its pure form) was the attempt to expand military efforts in many spheres, to intensify nuclear preparations in combination with an escalated race for conventional arms and armed forces. It is this road that the present Republican Administration has taken, thereby departing from Republican tradition in the military sphere. It is continuing the line taken up by the Carter Administration during the last years of his term in office, although it is naturally trying to add some of its own elements, to change certain points of emphasis and to leave its own imprint on U.S. military-political strategy (particularly the nuclear program).

At the basis of all this lies the reinforcement of the previous administration's reliance on military strength as an instrument of U.S. policy in all areas: against the socialist world and neutral states as well as in interrelations with allies. "We must be able to use military strength,"⁸ C. Weinberger said, defining the chief purpose of the changes. When A. Haig spoke of the United States' "more intransigent stand" with regard to the outside world and its willingness to use all necessary means to "protect" U.S. interests, he stressed: "This should include the arsenal of nuclear weapons which we are maintaining at such a high cost."⁹

The following specific elements of Washington's "new" military-political strategy in its present form are already apparent.

1. The intensification of the "full range" of military preparations, or, as C. Weinberger said, "on all levels of conflict and in all parts of the world important to our interests."¹⁰ The developing strategy envisages the buildup and modernization of all elements of the U.S. military machine--the strategic nuclear "triad" and possible additions to it, and all branches of the armed forces.
2. The concept of "superior opposition," which C. Weinberger called "the strategy of opposing with superior strength,"¹¹ which was elaborated by H. Brown, the previous administration's secretary of defense, and formed the basis of Carter's

presidential directive 59, has been taken as a guide in the nuclear sphere. When Weinberger addressed the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on 17 June 1981, he advocated the development of U.S. ability to wage prolonged nuclear war in such a way that the U.S. would remain superior to the other side after an "exchange" of nuclear strikes and during all stages of the conflict.¹² The most important element of this concept is the development of the "counterforce" capabilities of U.S. strategic forces, or, to put it more simply, reliance on the delivery of the first, or "disarming" strike. The nuclear program announced by President Reagan on 2 October 1981 represents a new step in this direction.¹³ Therefore, the administration is obviously continuing the efforts to legalize nuclear war.

3. The concept of "limited" nuclear war has not only been completely accepted but is also being invested with increasingly aggressive implications. Its purpose, which was frankly stated by the Reagan Administration's strategists, is to make nuclear war more "acceptable."

4. The intense preparations for the use of the nuclear fist in the European theater of combat are being continued: In a talk with small-town newspaper editors on 16 October, President Reagan candidly admitted that the United States was prepared for "limited" nuclear war in Europe. This administration has completely adopted its predecessors' plans to dramatically heighten the role of missiles and other nuclear medium-range offensive weapons in "limited" nuclear war in Europe or to use these weapons to exert political and other kinds of pressure on the socialist countries.

Therefore, the dangerous concepts of the Republican Administration's predecessors are not only being repeated in its military-political strategy but are being given even more emphasis. It is continuing to work on the plans, first worked out in the 1970's, to broaden the range of possibilities for the use of nuclear weapons, and this signifies intensive preparations for nuclear war--general or "limited"--and the willingness to be even more reckless than before in threatening the use of the nuclear fist in local conflicts, whether in the Middle East or in other parts of the world. It is true that the heads of the Reagan Administration (just as, incidentally, their predecessors) say that these plans would only be implemented as a last resort and that "a nuclear conflict would be a catastrophe."¹⁴ It is clear that the present U.S. Administration, just as its predecessors and its successors, cannot ignore the grim reality of the catastrophic consequences, threatening even to the United States, of any nuclear conflict.

5. In addition to developing its strategic forces, Washington is giving a great deal of attention to conventional weapons and armed forces. This is the sphere of the most persistent search (actively begun in the last few years by the previous administration) for more effective ways of preparing for the aggressive actions of the 1980's. In particular, the Pentagon leaders have openly announced their intention to considerably augment U.S. ability to wage a series of lengthy wars using conventional weapons, the effectiveness of which will be quickly enhanced. It is probably in this area that current U.S. ruling circles have progressed with special zeal, although even here the initiative for the fundamental advances was not theirs.

As we know, during the 1960's, when the United States adhered to the strategy of "flexible response," it already envisaged the possibility of two and a half wars (two major and one minor), although critics have stressed that Washington never did completely develop this ability. The Nixon Administration adopted the concept of one and a half wars, and this concept was later taken up by the Ford and Carter administrations.

The new American military leaders have determined to spend the 1980's building up U.S. ability to wage more than one and a half wars and to bring this figure up to two and a quarter or two and a half. From the very beginning, C. Weinberger has discussed five possible zones of war--Central Europe, the Persian Gulf, Africa, East Asia and Central America. In brief, this is another indication of the desire to surpass (even if only in rhetoric for the time being) previous administrations.

6. The Republicans are also energetically continuing the Democratic Administration's intense efforts to heighten the mobility and flexibility of U.S. armed forces and to single out special components ("rapid deployment forces") for the performance of police functions. Underscoring this continuity, C. Weinberger said: "President Carter realized too late that it would take additional capabilities to project American strength, and he tried to develop these capabilities. We, on the other hand, plan to make a much greater effort and to do this much more effectively and resolutely."¹⁵

Therefore, the concept of "projecting military strength," which has been ignored since the failure of the adventure in Indochina, has been reinstated in Washington. Furthermore, Washington's present strategists are giving this "projection" some new features.

7. Whereas just recently the emphasis was on the "blitzkrieg," the development of the capability for quick and massive operations (the "post-Vietnam syndrome" was dominating the thinking of Pentagon planners), the present discussion concerns lengthy wars of the conventional type, or wars not involving the use of nuclear weapons. A policy-planning directive for 1983 and the next 5 years, compiled by a defense policy analysis council, states that the Reagan Administration will emphasize preparations for "prolonged conventional warfare."¹⁶ It would be difficult to predict the consequences of this innovation, considering the fact that it will require the long-range reconstruction of American armed forces.

8. A new approach to the escalation of local conflicts has been announced. In the Pentagon chief's appeals to broaden "the capability for action in various regions, mobility and survivability" of U.S. armed forces to advance American "global interests," he has repeatedly stressed that Washington will reinforce its actions in a local conflict with strikes in other regions of its choice.¹⁷ In essence, this means a kind of escalation "contingency," an ability to quickly give a local conflict a global nature without using, according to current statements, nuclear forces. If this concept is developed further in U.S. military-political doctrine, there will be one more method of sliding swiftly into world war.

9. The present strategy includes the efforts to maximize the system of American military bases, efforts which were vigorously resumed at the end of the 1970's, particularly in comparatively new zones of potential American aggression (primarily

the Middle East). This has been accompanied by energetic attempts to supplement the bases with new alliances, although of a less rigid nature than the traditional military blocs of the first postwar years. The new approach to military bases (the use of bases officially under local control) has been supplemented with a new approach to alliances like Haig's proposed "unofficial agreement" about the "strategic consensus" of the United States, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey and some Arab countries, especially Egypt.¹⁸ The purpose is still the same--"to counteract Soviet influence in the region."

Changing times have forced Washington to be more cautious (a "consensus" instead of the CENTO bloc), but the essence is the same--a desire to mend and expand the old system of anti-Soviet alliances.

10. In relations with the United States' traditional allies, primarily Western Europe and Japan, the previous line is being maintained--the line of squeezing maximum military expenditures out of them and demanding that they expand their military preparations. The abovementioned policy-planning directive for 1983 and subsequent years stresses that the Reagan Administration will insist that the Western European allies and Japan "make a much greater contribution to common defense."¹⁹ This decision is already being persistently implemented.

As for Beijing, the current engineers of U.S. military-political strategy intend to considerably elevate the status of relations with the PRC in the military sphere. This is precisely the purpose of the present administration's willingness to supply China with American weapons.

Therefore, the developing outlines of the Reagan-Weinberger-Haig military-political strategy reflect some new and many old concepts and approaches, which are quite closely interrelated and have gained strength in all basic spheres. An obvious attempt is being made to appeal for new U.S. efforts to exert more military and political pressure on all world forces opposing Washington with the aid of the broadest possible range of means. This is not the first such attempt, but it is the first time the attempt has been made under the conditions of military strategic parity.

Postwar Parallels

The many recently published documents dating back to the first postwar years clarify American military policy of that time considerably and indicate that U.S. military-political strategy has passed through six stages of development since 1945.

The U.S. atomic monopoly gave rise to the first attempt to concentrate forces and means in the strategic weapon of that time, the atom bomb, and its carrier, the medium-range bomber. A series of now declassified military plans ("Charioteer," "Cogwheel," "Gunpowder," "Doublestar," "Dualism," "Fleetwood," "Dropshot" and others) and the first major document defining the essence of military-political strategy--a secret memorandum of the National Security Council, "NSC-20/4" (the number "4" signifies that the final memorandum was the fourth draft), signed by President Truman on 24 November 1948 and entitled "U.S. Goals in Relations with the USSR--The Counteraction of Soviet Threats to U.S. Security"--set forth the fundamental preparations for a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. The latter was

accused of all of the mortal sins, sometimes in terms which sound exactly like the rhetoric heard in Washington today: The USSR supposedly had the desire to "build up military potential as quickly as possible," "wage political, economic and ideological warfare," "advance Soviet-controlled groups to power and influence everywhere" and so on and so forth.²⁰ All forms of American behavior, on the other hand, were described as preparations for a nuclear attack. During this first stage of U.S. postwar strategy (1945-1950), Washington was concentrating its efforts and financial capabilities in the main sphere, the atomic one, and was therefore paying less attention to conventional armed forces and increasing the military budget more slowly than in later stages.

The second stage in the evolution of U.S. military-political strategy (1950-1952) differed considerably from the first. On the basis of secret memorandum NSC-68/2, "The Priorities of the United States and the National Defense Program," prepared under the supervision of P. Nitze and signed by H. Truman on 30 September 1950, all elements of the American military machine were built up to prepare it for military action on all levels. The strategy set forth in NSC-68, which represented a full-scale program for an attack on the USSR and its allies, proceeded from the collapse of the America atomic monopoly and from the belief that the Soviet Union, which had tested its own atomic bomb in 1949, would "soon be capable of striking at vitally important centers in the United States."²¹ The authors of the memo recommended the rapid development of the combat capabilities of U.S. conventional armed forces in various parts of the world, with no cessation of the buildup of nuclear weapons. The memo called for "a fundamental increase in military expenditures" (during the 3 years that this strategy was in effect, U.S. military expenditures almost quadrupled),²² "the accelerated buildup of U.S. strength," "the augmentation, as quickly as possible, of the conventional air, ground and naval forces of the United States and its allies to the degree that they will not be so dependent on atomic weapons" (in connection with the "vulnerability to a Soviet atomic attack"), preparedness for "limited and total" conflicts and for a "fierce political offensive against the Soviet Union" and the guarantee of the "superiority" of the United States and its allies "in the beginning and throughout the war."²³ "The lack of order among states is becoming less and less tolerable," the document says. "This has given us, in our own interests, the responsibility to govern the world."²⁴

As we can see, even then shrill claims to world superiority were being voiced, just as they are now being echoed by new voices in Washington. It is true that the style of that time, that period of intoxication with American power in a world just recovering from the upheavals of World War II, was slightly different from what it is now, but the program of that time is essentially the focus of the nostalgic yearnings of today's U.S. leaders.

The third stage in the development of U.S. military-political strategy (1953-1960) was connected with the strategy of "massive retaliation," announced by D. Eisenhower and J. F. Dulles and set forth in general in memorandum NSC-162/2, "Fundamental Policy in the Area of National Security," approved by the President on 30 October 1953. The strategy of "massive retaliation" took shape under the influence of the changing balance of world power (NSC-162/2 proceeded from the belief that the USSR could "inflict serious damages on the United States" in the event of nuclear war),²⁵ as well as the "post-Korea syndrome," which revealed the

material, political and moral groundlessness of the local military adventures for which the United States was prepared by the strategy set forth in NSC-68/2 (it was never given a name).

The strategy of "massive retaliation" put the emphasis back where it was immediately after the war, on the concentration of efforts in the nuclear sphere, on the use of nuclear weapons in wartime or peacetime to exert pressure on opponents of the United States. The armed forces were reduced in size and the growth of military appropriations slowed down, because, as mentioned above, previous Republican administrations of the postwar period traditionally advocated the more economical use of funds allocated for military purposes.

During the fourth stage in the development of military policy, another attempt was made to accomplish the fundamental re-arming of the United States, this time within the framework of the strategy of "flexible response" (1961-1968), beginning with the Kennedy Administration. Preparing gradually for the inevitable strategic parity with the Soviet Union, U.S. ruling circles of the period of "flexible response" repeated the NSC-68 strategy, but in a much more complex and diversified form. The chief aim was victory in confrontations (military or political) on lower levels of conflict than nuclear, the suicidal nature of which was now increasingly recognizable even to U.S. ruling circles.

"Flexible response" actually meant the escalation of military spending (within a few years these expenditures rose 15-20 percent and amounted to around 79 billion dollars in 1968, when the dollar was worth more than twice what it is worth today), the augmentation of the armed forces (to a total personnel figure of 3.55 million in 1968, the highest figure of the entire postwar period), the creation of various mobile subunits (similar to the present "rapid deployment forces") and intense preparations for local wars. It was then that ruling circles armed themselves with the concept of two and a half wars. The nuclear sphere was not ignored either: The massive buildup of strategic forces was accomplished here. Nevertheless, the main objective of this strategy was maximum freedom of action in local military-political ventures, a sphere in which the Johnson Administration was particularly distinguished.

The result of all this is well known: The aggression in Indochina, which took the lives of 50,000 Americans, cost the United States 150 billion dollars, ending in a crushing defeat for the United States and inflicted a severe moral wound from which the American society has still not recovered completely. The failure of the adventure in Indochina discredited the American style of "flexible response" for a long time.

The next strategy, "realistic deterrence" (1969-1976), marked the fifth stage in the development of U.S. postwar strategy and was formulated by the Nixon Administration when it had to recognize an extremely important change in the international situation--the military-strategic parity of the two systems. This strategy, just as all previous ones, was aimed at a search for more effective ways of using U.S. military strength in the international arena under new conditions. It was relatively less concerned with preparations for interventionist campaigns (the "post-Vietnam syndrome" had left its mark), the concept of one and a half wars was adopted, the armed forces were reduced in size somewhat and the growth of the

military budget was slowed down. But the engineers of the strategy of "realistic deterrence" were particularly fascinated with finding opportunities for at least the partial use of the U.S. nuclear arsenal for political purposes (and military ones, if the need should arise) and with diversifying the methods of its use. The most important new concept was the concept of "limited" nuclear war, known as the "Schlesinger concept" and set forth in a secret memorandum on decisions on national security, "MDNS-242," signed by R. Nixon on 17 January 1974. The provisions of this memo were later developed and stated more specifically in one of Carter's presidential directives, PD-59.

Continuing the search for opportunities to use nuclear weapons, the Carter Administration displayed, particularly in its last years, inexhaustible energy in the expansion of U.S. military potential in all areas, thereby beginning a new round, and the last one so far, of massive re-arming--the sixth stage in the development of military policy. The fundamentals of this new re-arming strategy, which has never been given any special name, were first set forth in PD-18, "The National Strategy of the United States," signed by J. Carter on 24 August 1977.

This policy of building up the armed forces and military resources of the United States and its allies was later reflected in numerous Washington and NATO decisions, particularly the resolutions of the NATO Council sessions in Washington (30-31 May 1978) and Brussels (13-14 December 1979). The new arms race begun by Carter is now being escalated by the Reagan Administration.

Escalation

The "trademark" of the present militant commotion in the United States is some kind of fanatical belief in the need to waste tens of billions--or, more precisely, hundreds of billions of dollars on weapons and military purposes in general. Through the combined efforts of these two administrations, appropriations for Pentagon programs have almost doubled (in comparable indicators) in just slightly over 2 years (see table).

A comparison of the Pentagon's 5-year plans, the allocations for which were inflated with particular zeal by the Carter Administration in 1980 (they also increased prior to this, but at a relatively uniform rate) and were then expanded even more by the Reagan Administration, illustrates the tremendous scales of militaristic extravagance.²⁶ Within just a single year (between January 1979, when the draft budget for 1980 was submitted to Congress, and January 1980, when the draft budget for 1981 was submitted), the Carter Administration's planners had increased the projected appropriations for the 5-year military program from 795.4 billion dollars to 1.182 trillion, or almost 1.5-fold. This did not seem to be enough. In January 1981, when the Democrats were leaving the political arena, they increased the 5-year draft plan to 1,300,700,000,000 dollars, or by another 10 percent. The new Washington leaders "threw in" another 187.4 billion dollars in their own draft, submitted on 10 March 1981, raising total planned appropriations to 1,488,100,000,000 dollars, or, in other words, increasing the sum by another 14.4 percent.

But this was not all. During the first half of the 1980's, the Reagan Administration plans to considerably raise the percentage of military expenditures in overall economic indicators: Whereas military expenditures represented 23.4

percent of the federal budget for fiscal year 1981, by 1986 the figure should rise to 37.6 percent.²⁷ Last year these expenditures accounted for 5.3 percent of the domestic gross product, but by 1986 the figure should rise to 7.1 percent according to some forecasts and to 8.1 percent according to others.²⁸ In other words, it will approach the percentage used for militaristic purposes during the time of the U.S. aggression in Indochina.

Military Appropriations Planned for the Coming 5 Years by the Carter and Reagan Administrations, in Billions of Dollars, in Current Prices

According to Draft Budget for Fiscal Years	Projected for Fiscal Years							5-Year Totals	
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	Years	Totals
1980	133.2	148.6	158.6	169.6	180.4			1980-1984	795.4
1981		161.8	183.4	205.3	228.3	253.2		1981-1985	1182.0
1982 (Carter Draft)			200.3	228.6	258.0	289.0	324.1	1982-1986	1300.7
1982 (Reagan Draft)			226.3	259.6	294.9	333.0	374.3	1982-1986	1488.1

"Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions," Washington, 1981, pp 34-99; "The Budget of the United States Government, FY 1981," Washington, 1980, p 45; *Ibid.*, FY 1980, Washington, 1979, p 49.

Some idea of where these new hundreds of billions of dollars will go can be gained from the data announced by the Reagan Administration regarding the expenditure of the additional funds it requested for fiscal years 1981 and 1982, the nuclear program of 2 October 1981 and other documents.

The administration's initial efforts were aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of general-purpose forces and heightening their preparedness for aggressive action in various parts of the world. This is why the closest attention is being given to larger purchases of new weapon systems for all branches of the U.S. armed forces.

Ground troops are being equipped more rapidly with the new M-1 tank (previously called the XM-1)--the "Abrams" (at first more than 7,000 tanks were to be put in operation, and now the figure is rising), armored troop carriers, missile systems, etc. The air force and naval aviation are quickly being equipped with a new generation of fighter planes (F-15, F-16 and F-18), attack aircraft (A-10) and strike helicopters. More than half of the increase in military expenditures for the current and next fiscal years (15.7 billion dollars) will be used to purchase new heavy equipment for general-purpose armed forces.

The Carter Administration's favorite offspring, the "rapid deployment force," is also the object of painstaking concern on the part of the present Washington authorities. The expense of creating and equipping this force has been almost doubled for the next 2 years (from 3 billion to 5.5 billion dollars), the number of men in the force now exceeds 200,000, the bases for their use are now being enlarged, especially in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean zones, and vehicles are being developed for the quicker transfer of these troops to regions of future U.S. interventionist campaigns. A special united command has been established for the Indian Ocean zone, thereby formally equating this region with the European and Far Eastern military theaters.

The navy has been surrounded by special attention, and this has already led to substantial disagreements in Washington. In particular, the sword of criticism was pointed at the decision to reactivate two old battleships, the "New Jersey" and "Iowa," and the aircraft "Oriskany." The battleships are to be equipped with strategic Tomahawk cruise missiles and shorter-range Harpoon missiles (up to 320 on each ship) and the aircraft carriers will be used to support forces cruising in the Persian Gulf zone. Plans have also been made to reactivate the old A-4 Skyhawk attack planes, which are among the smallest U.S. jet combat planes, for the "Oriskany."²⁹ More modern equipment is also being purchased in larger quantities for the navy.³⁰

But this is just the beginning. As C. Weinberger announced, "the road has been cleared for the construction of new aircraft carriers."³⁰ A program to increase the U.S. naval fleet from 456 to 600 vessels has been announced.³¹ The number of aircraft carrier groups will be increased from 12 to 15.

Some of the preparations for aggressive actions contrary to existing international agreements appear ominous. For example, the Pentagon directive for 1983 and the next 5 years calls for preparedness to wage chemical warfare.³² In other words, an attempt is being made to restore the possibility of using weapons of mass destruction.

Building on one of the most hazardous decisions of the Carter Administration, the present U.S. authorities are stubbornly preparing for the placement of 572 new medium-range missiles (464 Tomahawk cruise missiles and 108 Pershing-2 ballistic missiles) in Europe between 1983 and 1988. Furthermore, some people in Washington are advising an increase in this number.

Reagan's decision of 6 August 1981 (on the anniversary of the day the American atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima) to begin the full-scale production of neutron weapons was particularly ominous.

The Republican Administration's 6-year nuclear program, announced on 2 October 1981, plans for a new spurt of energy in the development of U.S. strategic forces. This will include the deployment of 100 new MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, the acceleration of the Trident 1 and Trident 2 SLBM programs, the production of 100 new B-1 bombers and their inclusion in the strategic aviation system, intensive preparations for the deployment of the next generation of bombers, the provision of B-52 and B-1 heavy bombers and submarines with cruise missiles with nuclear charges, and several other measures. Reagan's nuclear program is intended to double, or even more than double, the total number of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads. It will also step up the previous administration's efforts to enhance the "counterforce" characteristics of U.S. strategic forces (by increasing the accuracy and power of warheads) and their ability to strike the other side's strategic forces. In other words, U.S. armed forces will be in a higher state of readiness to deliver the first strike, thereby increasing the danger of a global nuclear conflict (naturally, with all of its devastating consequences for the United States).

The Reagan Administration's militant escapades are often undertaken on a scale suggesting that this administration is located in outer space, and not on a small planet which is oversaturated with weapons. It is hardly likely, however, that it will be able to avoid the need to recognize the realities of present-day international relations.

The first and foremost reality is the historical futility of all plans to achieve military-strategic superiority to the Soviet Union. This is due to many factors, including the solidity of the present balance and the tremendous scales of the nuclear potential of both sides. The attempts to achieve superiority to the Soviet Union and the entire socialist world are based on a total disregard for the historical experience of recent decades. Within the last 30 years the United States spent billions of dollars chasing the mirage of military superiority. Furthermore, when all of this began the Soviet Union had less economic potential, both in absolute and relative terms, than the United States.

The hope of "winning" the arms race is even more groundless now than ever before. The USSR is capable of matching all of the other side's moves. As L. I. Brezhnev stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress: "We have not tried and are not trying to be superior to the other side militarily. This is not our policy. But we will not allow anyone to establish this kind of superiority to us either. Such attempts, as well as discussions with us from a position of strength, are absolutely futile!"²³ Speaking in the heroic city of Kiev on 9 May 1981, L. I. Brezhnev again noted: "We do not support the arms race, we oppose it. We can find better uses for the funds it absorbs. But if we should have, we will find a quick and effective response to any militant imperialist challenge."³⁴ American imperialism will have to realize this fundamental reality of our day.

Washington's relations with its allies, who are expressing increasing anxiety over where the Republican Administration's senseless policy might lead them, are creating more and more difficulties in the implementation of its vigorously militaristic policy line. "Our American friends," prominent American commentator and former diplomat R. Steele wrote in this connection, "do not share the views of the Reagan Administration on the intentions of the Russians or on how Moscow should be approached. The attempts to take our allies in hand and persuade them to increase their military expenditures, which they regard as unnecessary and provocative, might simply capsize our alliance. They might also give rise to the neutralist feelings in Europe that we have been trying to prevent ever since the war."³⁵

Of course, centripetal forces are acting quite effectively in the Western alliance, but more frequent and more alarmed voices can be heard from Western Europe, cautioning the Republican Administration "not to rock the boat."

Friction has even been noticed in relations with Japan, whose government has quite obediently followed in the wake of Washington policy. According to reports in the American press, "the Japanese were simply dumbfounded" when a Pentagon representative at a conference in Hawaii in the beginning of June 1981 proposed the expansion of Japan's military program for the 1980's (suggesting an increase in the number of destroyers, submarines, war planes, etc.).³⁶ In view of the fact that this program is already arousing growing resistance in Japan, Washington's pressure is complicating Japanese-American relations.

The developing countries also have reason to worry. After all, the first large-scale re-arming of U.S. expansionist forces was connected with the war in Korea, and the second was connected with the war in Indochina. People in some Asian, African and Latin American capitals are naturally wondering what Washington's present spurt of energy means.

Even some Americans are expressing doubts about the feasibility of the current militaristic program from the standpoint of the capabilities of the American economy, although people in this country are not inclined to underestimate its potential, and even the possibility of "tightening belts" to a certain extent. According to some renowned American economists, L. Thurow from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J. Frelich from the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company and President M. Feldstein of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the "blitzkrieg of military expenditures" could escalate inflation and hazardously disrupt economic stability to such a degree that it would have to be "moderated."³⁷ Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the plan to transfer such huge sums to the military sector is based on overstated predictions of annual economic growth (4.4 percent) and labor productivity augmentation (3 percent a year) and understated predictions of the rate of inflation. Many economists consider these predictions to be unrealistic and have asserted that the annual increase in military spending of 7 percent in constant prices, planned for the coming 5 years, probably cannot be sustained. Naturally, these economic restrictions have not taken effect as yet because the military expenditures planned by the Reagan Administration have not been made.

The authors of the new militant plans are also inclined to overestimate the strength of their political and social support, although they are trying to use the growing chauvinistic feelings of some Americans. The majority of Americans, however (around 70 percent, according to most estimates), "are extremely worried about the possibility of world war."³⁸ It will be the broad masses who will have to bear the heavy burden of financing the arms race. C. Weinberger has candidly admitted that the augmentation of military expenditures in the future will be accomplished "primarily through the limitation of the growth of domestic programs."³⁹ Washington has cut social expenditures by approximately 35 billion dollars just for fiscal year 1982. This is only the beginning. Reagan's military budget will strike harder and harder at many millions of American families.

The Reagan Administration will have to face the realities of today's world and America itself, whether it wants to or not. But all of this does not make the present weapons boom and Washington's militaristic plans any less dangerous.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 3 November 1981.
2. Ibid.
3. IISS, "The Military Balance: 1980-1981," London, 1980, p 96.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14 August 1981.
5. Ibid., 17 May 1981.
6. FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1980, No 39, p 21.
7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 20 March 1981.

8. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 13 April 1981, p 46.
9. "Nomination of Alexander M. Haig, Jr.," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, pt 2, Wash., 1981, pp 75, 70.
10. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 16 March 1981.
11. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 10 March 1981.
12. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 18 June 1981.
13. Ibid., 3 October 1981.
14. "Nomination of Alexander M. Haig, Jr.," pt 1, pp 35, 36, 70.
15. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 13 April 1981, p 13.
16. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 30 June 1981.
17. Ibid., 7 May 1981.
18. Ibid., 21-22 March 1981.
19. Ibid., 30 June 1981.
20. "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948," vol 1, pt 2, Wash., 1976, p 663.
21. "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950," vol 1, Wash., 1977, p 266.
22. The figures then were not as large as they are now: 13 billion dollars in 1950 and over 50 billion in 1953, but the dollar is now worth less than a third of its value at that time.
23. "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950," vol 1, pp 267, 268, 282, 283, 285.
24. Ibid., p 242.
25. "United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967," Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, bk 9, Wash., 1971, p 175 (the text of NSC-162/2 was first published in these Pentagon "Vietnam documents").
26. It is significant that the draft 5-year military programs move ahead by only 1 year in each successive draft budget and the programs are therefore comparable in principle. As for the Reagan Administration's new program for 1982-1986, it is completely comparable to the previous one because the new appropriation sums are specified for precisely the same years (without moving a year ahead) as in the Carter Administration's previous program.
27. "Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions," Wash., 1981, p 125.

28. NEWSWEEK, 8 June 1981, p 23.
29. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 4 March 1981.
30. "Department of Defense. Statement by C. Weinberger Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 4 March 1981," Wash., 1981, p 12.
31. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 5 March 1981.
32. Ibid., 30 June 1981.
33. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 22.
34. PRAVDA, 10 May 1981.
35. THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2 April 1981.
36. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 1 July 1981.
37. NEWSWEEK, 8 June 1981, pp 22-23.
38. TIME, 11 February 1980, p 9.
39. INTERNATIONAL HERALL TRIBUNE, 6 March 1981.

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OIL TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 17-28

[Article by A. Ye. Primakov]

[Text] The life of Aleksandr Yevgen'yevich Primakov, research associate at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, came to a tragic and sudden end when he was only 28.

He did not live long, but he managed to accomplish a great deal.

This article represents a small part of Aleksandr Yevgen'yevich's works in progress, some of which he had just begun and some of which were near completion.

The 26th CPSU Congress directed attention to the need for the further study and analysis of the activities and role of today's transnational corporations as a new phenomenon in the capitalist world.

One of the most important aspects of this multifaceted topic is the activity of transnational corporations in the liberated countries. The interrelations between American and other transnational oil corporations and the oil-exporting countries constitutes an important and independent area, requiring serious scientific analysis, of the expanding process of economic decolonialization. It is in this area that we find the particularly close interaction of economic and political aspects of the decolonialization process, the role played in this process by liberated countries with progressive and conservative regimes, throwbacks to power politics and the tactic of corporate adaptation.

The Basic Areas and Results of Struggle

In spite of the common goals and methods of struggle by the liberated countries against transnational corporations, the struggle in the world oil industry has certain distinctive features. It has been waged and is being waged against the strongest opponent--the petroleum monopolies, especially the American ones. In its most acute forms it began earlier than in other branches of the extractive industry and plantation farming, produced more tangible results and played a

largely innovative role in the development of interrelations between countries producing raw materials and transnational corporations. Furthermore, many measures were directed mainly or primarily against American oil monopolies as the entities representing the most unequal forms of economic relations.

Above all, this applies to the key demand of economic decolonialization, the return of the developing countries' complete and inalienable sovereignty over their own natural resources. By 1975 the national companies of these countries accounted for 62 percent of all capitalist oil production, as against 12 percent in 1972,¹ while the share of the industry controlled by the international oil cartel headed by American transnationals dropped from 73 percent to 30 percent. By the end of the 1970's the liberated countries had completely done away with the system of concessions that had once determined the socioeconomic appearance of their petroleum industry, had nationalized oil fields on a broad scale and firmly controlled prices in the crude oil market, raising these prices numerous times (they rose approximately 21-fold between 1970 and the first quarter of 1981). In particular, by the beginning of 1978 there were 220 recorded cases in which the property of foreign oil monopolies, most of them American, had been nationalized in all of the developing countries.² To some degree, all of this set an example and paved the way for the producers of other raw materials, although no other group has been as successful in this area as OPEC.

In this context, it would be expedient to note the current heated arguments over the exact nature of the nationalization of foreign property in the petroleum industry of the developing countries. Some researchers believe that if the country maintains certain ties with former concession-holders after this nationalization, the nationalization is not revolutionary or democratic. Others view any form of nationalization as a step forward, particularly in the realization of the demands for a new world economic order.

It appears that reality is much more complex. It must be borne in mind that many of the oil-exporting countries still lack the necessary financial and technical potential and administrative experience for the independent exploitation of oil deposits after nationalization and therefore must make use of the equipment, technology and services of foreign firms, including former concession-holders, to some degree. It is through these channels that foreign capital is striving, and will continue to strive, for not only its commercial goal, but also certain socio-economic objectives and will urge economically underdeveloped countries to choose a developmental course which corresponds to its own interests. In his analysis of concessions, V. I. Lenin issued numerous warnings to this effect.³ Therefore, the chief criterion to be used in evaluating the nature of nationalization is apparently not its volume or even its form, but the actual content of the given state's interrelations with the former concessionaire. The main problem is still the question of whether nationalization is part of a general program of progressive national reforms or whether foreign capital will continue to direct the country and not let it out of the orbit of its sociopolitical influence even after the formal loss of its ownership of mineral deposits. In particular, in the world of petroleum we can find examples of states which, after conducting nationalization and minimizing their ties with foreign capital, nonetheless remain conservative and even pro-imperialist, and of states which maintain broad technical and economic contacts with foreign capital without any adverse effect on their own progressive orientation.

The right of developing states to nationalize their own natural resources is now recorded in many international documents and is hardly ever disputed. After a series of incidents in the 1960's in which the property of petroleum transnationals was expropriated without any compensation, they had to agree to nationalization with compensation voluntarily. The terms of this compensation represent an extremely complex problem in themselves, resulting in heated battles, and here the oil-exporting countries have also taken a new approach.

At first the transnationals tried to maximize compensation by insisting that it had to include not only their real assets in the country but also the estimated value of the petroleum deposits they discovered during the period the concessions were in force. In other words, they tried to sell national resources to the governments of countries which already owned these resources. Furthermore, the assets of the transnationals were calculated according to their original (full) value. In both cases the American transnationals belonging to the international oil cartel took the extreme, maximalist stand. For example, during the transactions connected with the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), its stockholders tried to acquire a huge sum from Iraq as "payment" for the oil they had discovered even though it was owned by this country; similarly, in Saudi Arabia, Aramco demanded that the government pay the full price of nationalized equipment without any deductions for depreciation. The consistent struggle of countries with progressive regimes, however, put an end to this practice. Iraq was able to reject the greedy demands of the IPC, and in 1973 Libya was the first country to pay for nationalized assets (Occidental Petroleum) according to their remaining value, and not their original cost--in other words, in real terms with deductions for depreciation. Later these conditions became the norm in the petroleum industry⁴ and spread from here to other raw material sectors in the developing countries.

In most cases, local governments concluded long-term petroleum shipment agreements with former concessionaires after nationalization to avoid the loss of established channels and markets for the sale of petroleum. The network of these agreements, unconnected with joint participation in the capital of any company, still constitutes the basis of the international capitalist oil market. The terms of these agreements, however, are undergoing an interesting evolutionary process. At first the former concession-holders were receiving not only petroleum shipped in accordance with compensation agreements, but also all or almost all of the remaining oil exported by the country (Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela). For example, according to a 1973 agreement with Iran, the international petroleum cartel was guaranteed the right to purchase all oil produced in the country with the exception of oil used for domestic consumption and 1.5 million barrels a day to be sold independently in the foreign market by Iran's national oil company; furthermore, the cartel was able to gain a discount of 22 cents a barrel.⁵ Now, on the other hand, the proportion of oil contracted by former concessionaires is gradually decreasing and the proportion sold independently by the national companies of developing countries is increasing. At the same time, the group of long-term partners is widening; it no longer includes only former concessionaires. In Kuwait, for example, these purchases are made not only by the former owners of Kuwait Oil--British Petroleum and the American Gulf firm--but also by Royal Dutch Shell, which did not operate in this country in the past.⁶

An even more important indicator of the petroleum-producing countries' successful struggle against oil imperialism is the appearance of new forms of contract relations between these countries and the transnationals, based on a recognition of these countries' ownership of the oil and thereby differing from traditional forms of activity by foreign private capital in this area. The connecting link in the transition to these relations was the company jointly owned by the transnational corporation and the government of the oil-producing country. On the whole, however, they did not remain in existence for long and were replaced by "non-stock" forms of relations, the most important of which are the building contract, the technical assistance agreement and the managerial contract.

One of the common features of these three forms of relations is that sovereignty over petroleum resources and the right to own oil deposits and all oil produced are retained by the oil-producing country while the foreign partners are simply compensated with oil shipments for a specific group of goods and services. Therefore, in this case the oil-producing countries have some access to the financial and technological potential of foreign firms without allowing them to own and control nationalized deposits. It was not a simple matter to replace the previous investment forms of interrelations with these "non-stock," contract forms. For example, Algeria's state-owned oil company, SONATRACH, and Indonesia's Pertamina, which pioneered the use of these forms, were first directly boycotted by the transnational oil corporations. But the collective struggle of the developing countries for their interests, the use of accumulated experience in fair and mutually beneficial relations with the socialist states and the shortage of crude oil in the world capitalist market eventually forced the transnationals to agree to contracts (although even here, as will be demonstrated below, they have already learned to take care of their own interests). Inter-imperialist rivalry and the attacks on the position of the international oil cartel by many non-American, partly governmental oil firms in various capitalist countries and by an entire group of outsiders in the U.S. oil business--Marathon, Atlantic Richfield, Amerada Hess, Occidental Petroleum, Murphy, Hunt and others also played a role here.

Each of the listed forms of contract relations has its own distinctive features. In the case of the building contract the foreign partner generally takes on the work of prospecting oil and gas deposits and starting their exploitation and is paid for these services with petroleum, sometimes even retaining the priority right to purchase petroleum over and above the contracted amount of compensation. For example, while the shah was still ruling Iran, this country concluded an agreement with the French Sofiram company, in accordance with which it financed petroleum prospecting in Iran and then turned over the discovered deposits to the national Iranian petroleum company, for which it received payment in the form of oil shipments.⁷ This kind of contract can also be conditional, in the sense that the compensation of the foreign firm or cooperation with it directly in the production of petroleum are only conducted if prospecting results in the discovery of a certain minimum number of deposits suitable for commercial exploitation.

Sometimes the contracting functions are reduced to the offer of only a specific, agreed-upon set of technical and consultative services to the client country for payment in the form of petroleum. They can also consist in prospecting, drilling, organization, collection, storage and other elements of the oil production process.

In Iran, for example, the American Ashland Oil Company, West Germany's Deminex, France's Elf-Arab, Brazil's Petrobras, India's Oil and Natural Gas and other companies agreed to work on these terms.⁸

All of these contracts envisage the right of the host country to retain full control over the operations of petroleum companies and to receive regular progress reports from them, and their obligation to carry out all of the work. Contract disputes can only be settled by local courts and on the basis of local legislation. Sometimes the contractor is also obligated to use primarily local personnel, equipment and materials. There has also been a tendency toward a departure from contracts with a purely compensatory basis and a move toward monetary payment for services, with or without the guaranteed right to use this money to purchase local petroleum at the current price. This procedure gives national oil companies more freedom in commercial maneuvers and allows for the inclusion of machine-building, engineering consultant and other firms among their partners along with transnational oil companies. All of the oil-exporting countries are making more extensive use of these agreements, generally with outsider firms in the oil business.

Of course, only the national companies with the necessary infrastructure are able to sell their own petroleum in the foreign market even under the conditions of the oil shortage, but this is far from always the case. This is why many national companies have had to sign managerial contracts with foreign firms, within the framework of which they invite foreign specialists to fill administrative positions in their countries or allow their overseas partners to take full responsibility for one of the links of the petroleum production operation, especially the sales link. For example, Royal Dutch Shell sells part of Kuwait's oil in overseas markets, Italy's Agip supplies the Italian market with Iranian oil for a commission, Sofiram does the same in the French market (for a commission of 2 percent), and France's Elf-Arab is widely involved in such contracts in Africa.⁹

Just as nationalization and the method of calculating compensation, these "non-stock" forms of interrelations in the petroleum industry also became a prototype for other branches, particularly the bauxite, iron ore, phosphate and sugar sectors, where similar processes of economic decolonialization and the limitation of the operations of American and other transnational corporations are going on.

At the same time, the transnational corporations have been energetically adapting to these processes and to changing conditions and have also been able to mobilize new forms and methods of protecting their interests and preserving their influence in the oil-producing countries.

The Monopolies Regroup their Forces

The successes of the national liberation movement are undermining the position of transnational corporations. But the dependent and unequal status of the liberated states in the world capitalist economic system is far from a thing of the past. Furthermore, the successes of the OPEC countries in economic decolonialization as a result of the exacerbation of the global energy problem actually coincided with the comparative reinforcement of the position of transnational oil companies in the corporate hierarchy. As a result, the oil producers are now confronting the most powerful segment of monopolistic capital.

For example, 8 of the 25 largest American industrial corporations were oil companies in 1929, including 4 among the top 10 corporations.¹⁰ Now their position is even stronger. According to the data of FORTUNE magazine for 1980, oil companies accounted for 18 of the top 50 U.S. industrial corporations, 13 of the top 25, 6 of the top 10 and 4 of the top 5 (in terms of turnover). Their present size has made the term "outsider" extremely conditional. For example, Getty Oil ranks a modest 14th among the American oil corporations. On the list of the 500 largest industrial companies in the nation, however, it ranks 26th and is ahead of such well-known firms (including even the Pentagon's main contractors) as Union Carbide, Boeing, Chrysler, Westinghouse, Xerox, RCA, Rockwell International and others. The financial indicators of oil companies are also impressive. Their profit on stock capital rose from 12.1 percent in 1971-1975 to 15.6 percent in 1976-1980 and 19.4 percent in 1980.¹¹ Even before the events of 1973 the American transnational oil corporations were diversifying and turning into comprehensive energy corporations and were quite successful in passing the rising price of oil on to the final consumer and retaining absolutely tangible means of exerting pressure on the OPEC countries.

The specific tactics employed by these international monopolies under the conditions of the developing process of economic decolonialization and the degrees to which they use force or adaptation differ widely from one transnational corporation to another. Three major means can be discerned, however, in their attempts to preserve their influence in the world capitalist oil market--control over the transport, refining and sale of petroleum; the monopolization of technology and shipments of equipment for the oil industry; and, finally, the "fifth column," which they control in many petroleum-exporting countries and in OPEC in general.

When we discuss the first of these means, we must realize above all that nationalization did away with transnational control only in the petroleum extractive industry, in the initial link of the chain along which petroleum travels from the producer to the consumer. Other links are still controlled by these monopolies and, in spite of all of the efforts of the petroleum-exporting countries, changes in this area have essentially consisted only in the repartition of the market among individual corporations. For example, there are more "independent" (not dependent on the cartel monopolies) companies in petroleum refining and some petroleum is transported and refined by government-owned companies in the Western countries, which have established direct contacts with producers. On the whole, however, the transnational corporations have retained their dominant status as a middleman between the producer and the consumer, and this is what has allowed them to increase their profits and improve other financial indicators of their activity in spite of the rising price of oil, appropriate some oil leases and dictate monopoly prices to the consumer.

The OPEC countries (and not even all of them) are just beginning to establish their own petroleum refining industry, their fleet of tankers is extremely small (and many of them are chartered from the same transnational corporations), and as for retail trade in petroleum products, the transnational corporations control many chains of gas stations even within these countries. Exxon alone, for example, purchases and extracts 160 different types of petroleum and ships it on 500 tankers from 115 ports to 270 points of destination in 65 countries.¹² As a result, the transnational corporations and the oil-producing countries are dependent on one another. "More than three-fourths of the capital investments in this

sector," N. Jacoby, prominent expert on petroleum affairs, wrote in this connection, "are embodied in pipelines, tankers, refineries, chemical enterprises and a sales network outside the control of OPEC members. Of course, many of these would be useless without OPEC oil, but the OPEC members need sales markets for their oil just as much as the oil companies need to acquire it."¹³

This puts the transnational corporations in the position of an arbiter, so to speak, between consumers in West, who have no alternative to dependence on imported petroleum, and the oil producers, who export only petroleum. This reduces the economic maneuverability of both and objectively forces them to maintain contacts with transnational corporations. Obviously, the situation differs from one oil-exporting country to another (see table). But, as a result, according to the estimate of Gulf Oil Chairman of the Board J. McAfee, "international petroleum corporations control from 60 to 70 percent of the international oil trade." According to other estimates, the international oil cartel accounts for 50-80 percent of all operations in the final link of the petroleum chain, the sales link, in almost all of the developed capitalist countries,¹⁴ and most of the oil transactions are handled by U.S. monopolies (see table).

Transnational Oil Corporations' Share of Oil Production
Before and After Nationalization

Countries	1971			1976			Other Companies Including U.S. National Firms
	Five Top U.S. Companies*		Remaining U.S. Companies	Other Companies, Including National Firms		Five Top U.S. Companies*	
	Companies*	Companies	Firms	Companies*	Companies	Firms	
Saudi Arabia	94.3	1.9	3.8	90.8	0.9	8.3	
Iran	31.8	7.6	60.6	27.4	7.1	65.5	
Kuwait	57.6	2.8	39.6	26.3	4.2	69.5	
Iraq	37.3	--	62.7	--	--	100.0	
United Arab Emirates	13.9	4.4	81.2	5.1	9.4	84.5	
Qatar	12.3	--	87.7	3.6	--	96.4	
Libya	28.2	56.5	15.3	15.1	54.1	30.8	

* Exxon, Gulf, Mobil Oil, Texaco and Standard Oil of California.

J. Lichtblau et al, "Vertical Divestiture and OPEC: A Critical Examination of the Arguments for Vertical Divestiture of U.S. Foreign Oil Operations," New York, 1977, p 23.

When we discuss the second means employed by transnational corporations to preserve their influence in the petroleum market, we should note that the technical appearance of the petroleum industry has been substantially updated and it has become more science-intensive, particularly when new deposits are being worked, in recent years in connection with the deterioration of the geological conditions of oil production in the capitalist world and the transfer of this production to zones with extreme conditions, to the continental shelf, etc. However, the necessary technology is developed and owned mainly by the transnational corporations and

machine-building companies connected with them, and this is giving rise to the strong technological dependence of producers on these corporations. The producers cannot always take full advantage of inter-imperialist rivalry either because this technology is distributed among the Western countries through the channels of license agreements, which impose restrictions on its transfer. In this area as well, American monopolies are holding on to the leading position.

Experts list the following among the types of corporate-owned technology on which the OPEC countries now depend, with virtually no other alternative: equipment for the extraction of oil and gas in near-inaccessible regions with an extreme climate (tundra, mountains, jungles, etc.); the technology for off-shore drilling and extraction with semisubmerged and submerged platforms; methods of recovering oil from deposits with a complex geological structure; the technology of "secondary" and "tertiary" recovery, particularly from old strata; technology for the extraction and refining of substandard types of petroleum (heavy petroleum, high-sulphur and paraffin-base petroleum, etc.); methods of recovering and utilizing casing-head gas; technical equipment for satellite-aided geological prospecting; methods of protecting the environment in oil fields, especially marine deposits; and so forth.

In general, the petroleum monopolies now control the main elements of technology for such stages of petroleum production as prospecting, drilling, on-site construction, extraction, transportation, refining and sales. Machine-building companies control drilling, construction, extraction and shipment technology; contractors and consulting firms control elements of technology for all links of the "petroleum chain" with the exception of the sales link. Furthermore, now that the transnationals have turned into comprehensive energy corporations, they also control technology for the derivation of energy from alternative sources, and this is also affecting relations with the producers of traditional sources. At the same time, the OPEC countries, and not even all of them, have experience only in the extraction of liquid fuel in a normal climate, its transport by tanker and pipeline and the most elementary purification and refining processes.¹⁵

Even though the petroleum monopolies are losing their superior technological status in the traditional subbranches of oil production, their position is much stronger in the new subbranches on which the future of the petroleum industry will depend. For example, Exxon and Royal Dutch Shell are among the leaders in off-shore drilling, British Petroleum controls technology for the derivation of protein from petroleum, Conoco controls the technology for deep drilling on land, etc. As a result, even Norway and England, which originally wanted their own national companies to work North Sea oil deposits, nonetheless had to make use of the services of American petroleum transnationals.¹⁶ As for the developing countries which export petroleum, they usually do not extend nationalization to foreign concessions in the continental shelf zone.

Finally, we must say a few words about the third method used by transnationals to influence the situation in the petroleum industry. In the complex world of petroleum interrelations have never been only economic in nature. N. K. Krupskaya's account of J. Hobson's book "Imperialism," with which V. I. Lenin was working, says: "Investors have an interest in reducing the risk connected with political conditions in countries where they invest their capital."¹⁷ For this reason, the

transnationals have always tried to put down the deepest possible roots in the domestic political life of the oil-exporting countries and establish a kind of "fifth column" here to protect their interests. Its composition is fairly diverse and generally represents a cross-section of all strata close to political power or possessing this power. Sometimes this is simply the ruling elite, backed up by the support of the West and therefore pro-imperialist, as in the case of Iran before the revolution. Transnationals are also associated with certain segments of the local bourgeoisie (subcontractors, agents and suppliers), the embourgeoisé gentry, the technocratic elite and, in some places, even the "elite" labor unions they have founded. The "fifth column" is made cohesive by distributing some of the stock of the transnational corporation among its members, appointing some to high-paid jobs, paying part of their salary in hard currency, resorting to corruption, etc. A new important way in which transnationals are maintaining "discipline" among their supporters consists in depositing their financial resources, especially petro-dollars, in Western banks and managing these funds.

It is therefore not surprising that the transnational oil corporations sometimes find ways of protecting their own interests even within the framework of the new contract relations engendered by decolonialization and nationalization. In addition to receiving payment in the form of scarce oil, the transnational corporations view these relations as a method of avoiding the strict association of their operations with specific deposits, escaping the danger of social upheavals, the consequences of which are usually most harmful to foreign property, and persuading local ruling circles to agree to long-term cooperation. The contracts also allow transnationals to reduce their swelling overseas assets wherever this is expedient and give them new opportunities to ship petroleum equipment overseas at commercial prices rather than lower intraorganizational prices. For example, the relationship between total sales and assets, which was always quite low for U.S. oil monopolies in comparison to other transnationals due to their huge volume of overseas assets, rose from 0.78 in 1960 to 1.62 in 1980. In other words, it rose more quickly for these monopolies than for monopolies in any other industry.¹⁸

Many Western petroleum specialists also view the "non-stock" forms as a means of reconciling the transnationals and oil-exporting countries and making their interests "parallel" rather than conflicting. These specialists feel that when the assets of transnationals are no longer threatened by nationalization, they will become more independent of producers, and the latter are already more interested in expanding oil production and less interested in coordinating their policies within the OPEC framework. "This system," American experts state, "will open up the commercially promising deposits of raw materials that have been closed to exploitation as a result of economic nationalism. It will make the creation of producer cartels difficult and will complicate their functioning."¹⁹

Of course, far from all of these wishes will come true. It is no secret, however, that the supply of petroleum in the world capitalist market has recently matched demand and even exceeded it and that the ruling circles of some petroleum-exporting countries now have common interests with former concession-holders. Furthermore, on the purely financial level, the transnationals are using "non-stock" forms to transfer much of the risk in extraction and prospecting to these countries while guaranteeing the profitability of their own operations by including fixed (and overstated) standard fees in license, managerial and other contracts by raising the price of equipment, services, etc. "Non-stock cooperation," the same experts

note, "reduces the political risk for companies and creditors and divides the commercial risk among companies, creditors, consumers and the governments of host countries."²⁰ As a result the profitability of transnational operations within the "non-stock" framework sometimes falls just short of the profitability of old forms of corporate operations.

For this reason, it is obvious that when we assess the course of events in this sphere of international economic relations, we must consider the evolution of the forms and essence of the relations between transnationals and producers and remember V. I. Lenin's statement that monopolistic capital can only be effectively restrained if "reactionary bureaucratic regulation is turned into revolutionary democratic."²¹

With Government Backing

Given the present balance of class power in the world, the transnationals can no longer oppose the process of economic decolonialization on their own. They are also incapable of independently taking many of the measures needed for their adaptation to current changes. This is why they can rely on their own bourgeois government to assist them in overseas operations, as this government has constantly increasing strategic interests in the petroleum world.

In the past these interests consisted primarily in the uninterrupted provision of the imperialist countries with petroleum at low monopoly prices and in appropriating part of the oil leases acquired by transnationals through taxation. A system of measures was therefore created for the government's constant political and economic support of "its own" transnational corporations and for its intervention in events in the oil-producing countries at "crucial" moments. In conjunction with the transnationals' own operations, this system formed the neocolonial type of oil supply which, along with other factors, lay at the basis of the economic growth of the main capitalist countries in the 1960's and early 1970's. In the United States the economic basis of this system consisted of tax privileges for transnational petroleum corporations (depletion allowances), compensation for the concession fees paid to producers and exemption from anti-trust legislation, which allowed them to join the international oil cartel. The strategic routes for the shipment of oil through the Mediterranean were guarded by the American Navy, and American diplomacy was working in favor of the transnationals on the national and international levels. In particular, it stubbornly objected to the developing countries' just demands in the United Nations in regard to questions of economic development. At the same time, U.S. diplomacy actively impeded the reinforcement of government oil companies in Western Europe and, in general, any kind of government control over even part of the oil market. Finally, even then Washington had accepted the plan for "special relations" with some of the larger oil-producing countries, which were delegated the functions of regional strongholds of struggle against the national liberation movement.

Different aspects of the transnational oil corporation's alliance with the bourgeois government have already been analyzed in detail in Soviet scientific literature.²² This is why it would be best to limit this discussion to the new features acquired by this alliance as a result of the changing situation in the oil-producing countries.

After their property had been nationalized in these countries, the petroleum transnationals could no longer employ their previous methods of providing their governments with a constant supply of cheap oil, especially during an energy crisis. Furthermore, to avoid losing their access to petroleum, they sometimes even followed the advice of host governments rather than their own, particularly in regard to oil rationing. Finally, true to their own greedy nature, the transnationals staged the "fraud of the century" for consumers in their own countries by passing the rising cost of liquid fuel on to them with interest and by demanding the cancellation of all price controls. Some American experts even began to believe, as R. Kruger did, that "American and foreign oil companies operating overseas have virtually become the hostages of the main oil-producing countries and have no more desire or opportunity to object to their demands for higher prices."²³ References were made, for example, to the "two-faced" behavior of Aramco, which supposedly reduced oil production more than Riyadh wanted and, furthermore, refused to supply the American Navy with petroleum products. Just as many other experts, Kruger certainly overdramatizes events, but it is nevertheless true that the price hike was to the benefit of petroleum transnationals and to the detriment of their base countries and that this disposed some state-monopolistic circles in these countries against the transnationals, especially in the countries suffering most from the higher prices.

There was a corresponding change in the oil policy of the imperialist states, which became dual in nature, directed on the one hand toward the continued support of the overseas operations of their "own" transnationals, and on the other toward stricter control over these operations. Among the main objectives of the first facet of this new policy were a guaranteed level of oil production, sufficient to cover the needs of the United States and the other main capitalist countries, the cessation or deceleration of the rise in oil prices, the closer integration of the oil-producing countries in the world capitalist economy and, finally, the subversion of OPEC unity. It is obvious that the interests of the Western governments and the transnationals virtually coincided in regard to at least the first, third and fourth objectives.

The methods used to attain these objectives included the "recycling" of petrodollars, shipments of food and weapons and diplomatic pressure, but the greatest reliance was still placed in "special relations," until their fragility was demonstrated by the revolution in Iran. Under these conditions, elements of power polities began to regain their previous strength in the official oil policy of the West at the end of the 1970's. Even countries with conservative regimes had to keep an eye on the American "big stick" and take care not to step "out of bounds."

"Transactions between the oil-producing states and consumer countries are based on force...because military strength or its absence are just as much realities of today's world as oil deposits, the embargo or the price structure," American political correspondent T. Wicker acknowledged. "Under these conditions, our tangible factor, military strength, must play the same role in transactions as their main factor, oil deposits.... The oil-producing countries must be reminded that attempts to smother the Western world or actions transcending certain bounds can only bring them catastrophe."²⁴ Given the present new situation, even the "special relations" between the United States and some oil-producing countries are becoming more than mere allied ties. The United States wants to control the foreign and military

policy of its "allies" and is trying to monopolize their foreign economic relations and force certain standards of development on them. This policy is being conducted in relations with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates and is producing some results. For example, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have repeatedly opposed oil price increases, have plotted against OPEC members with progressive regimes and have augmented oil production during shortages. In particular, the growth of the Saudi output to 500 million tons in 1980-1981 allowed oil monopolies to virtually nullify operations in the free oil market in Rotterdam, which once covered the shortage of petroleum in the market, and accumulate strategic 3-month oil reserves totaling 440 million tons in the oil-importing developed capitalist countries.

Imperialist circles now see "guarantees" of the Western oil supply in the American naval fleet in the Persian Gulf, the "rapid deployment forces," the tens of thousands of military advisers servicing military equipment supplied to oil-producing countries by the United States and some Western European powers and the new network of military bases in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the oil policy of the imperialist states is coordinated through the International Energy Agency, in which Washington's influence prevails.

An armored foundation has been laid under the position of the transnationals in the oil market. Nevertheless, they had to give up some of their traditional operational freedom. Some of their tax privileges were cancelled, official report, control and inspection requirements became stricter, etc.

In general, the alliance linking the transnational oil corporations with the bourgeois government is still pursuing the same goals, namely the suspension and adulteration of the process of economic decolonialization and the restriction of reforms to the capitalist framework. Now, however, the attainment of these goals is extremely questionable. This is primarily due to the growing social differentiation of the developing world, where the OPEC members include states which have chosen a socialist orientation in addition to feudal theocracies. Furthermore, as a counterbalance to the saber-rattling policy of the United States and NATO, a specific fact is receiving increasing international recognition: Real economic decolonialization can only be accomplished in an atmosphere of peace, detente and productive economic development.

FOOTNOTES

1. Doc UNIDO ID/B/209, p 8.
2. "Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-Examination," United Nations, N.Y., 1978, pp 233-234.
3. See V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], vol 42, pp 75-78; vol 43, pp 165-182.
4. "Middle East and North Africa," London, 1978, pp 94-96; "Supplement to Petroleum Legislation," No 17, 1 May 1975, pp 1, 2.
5. "Middle East and North Africa," p 95.

6. "Supplement to Petroleum Legislation," No 34, pp 3-10.
7. "Middle East and North Africa," p 92.
8. "Supplement to Petroleum Legislation," No 26, p 17.
9. W. Friedmann and J. Beguin, "Joint International Business Ventures in Developing Countries," N.Y., 1971, pp 35-36; "Middle East and North Africa," p 92; "Supplement to Petroleum Legislation," No 26, p 17.
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13. N. Jacoby, "Multinational Oil," London, 1974, p 84.
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15. "Transnational Energy Corporations and Developing Countries," United Nations, N.Y., 1978, p 163.
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17. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 28, p 387.
18. FORTUNE, 4 May 1981, pp 116, 117.
19. C. Bergsten, T. Horst and T. Moran, "American Multinationals and American Interests," Wash., 1978, p 162.
20. Ibid.
21. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 34, p 168.
22. See, for example, B. Rachkov, "Neft' i mirovaya politika" [Oil and World Politics], Moscow, 1972; R. Andreasyan and A. Kazyukov, "OPEK v mire nefti" [OPEC in the Oil World], Moscow, 1978.
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24. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 12 January 1975.

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UNITED STATES AND THIRD UNITED NATIONS SEA LAW CONFERENCE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 29-39

[Article by Ye. Ye. Yakovin]

[Text] The Third UN Sea Law Conference has been meeting for 7 years now¹ to thoroughly reorganize and codify sea law with a view to current developments.

In the last quarter of the 20th century questions connected with the exploration and use of the world ocean and its resources have become particularly urgent and pertinent. This is one of the global problems of the present day, concerning the vital interests of all groups of states and the fate of present and future generations. The expanses of the world ocean, which occupy two-thirds of our planet's surface, and its abundant biological and mineral resources are being incorporated more and more intensively in the world economy under the conditions of the technological revolution and are becoming the focus of the conflicting interests of large groups of states. They are whetting the appetites of some imperialist and extremist groups striving to divide and conquer the ocean expanses and sources of raw materials. In addition, a large group of liberated states has become involved in the exploration of world ocean resources in the last decade.

Under the influence of these processes, the law of the sea has become the most changeable link in the entire system of contemporary international law. These changes are reflected in the draft general accord on the law of the sea, the text of which has already been compiled in general and has been agreed upon by participants in the Third UN Sea Law Conference. At its Ninth Session in August 1980, representatives of all 150 states, including the U.S. delegate, unanimously voted to complete the drafting of the convention in 1981 and adopt it at the 10th conference session;² the first half of the 10th session took place in New York in March and April 1981, and the second half took place in August in Geneva.

The process of the international regulation of urgent sea law problems by the conference encompasses all areas and institutions connected with sea conditions and resources. An important feature of the conference's work is the desire of its participants to work out, during the course of long and complex negotiations, in confrontation and cooperation by various groups of states and on the basis of compromise, intersupplementary and interrelated principles and standards for the future general accord. Under these conditions, it is obvious that no one state can hope for decisions benefiting one side and restricting the interests of others.

In the past, right up to 1981, the United States, just as other states, took a fairly realistic and constructive stand, participated actively in conference negotiations, supported efforts to overcome the differing opinions of various groups of states and helped in the compilation of a compromise draft of an all-encompassing accord on sea law. This line was conducted by all American administrations in the 1970's. When H. Kissinger was secretary of state, he announced: "No other international negotiations are more important now, from the standpoint of long-range stability and prosperity on our planet.... The cessation of the present talks and the inability to agree on legal questions will lead to unrestrained military and commercial rivalry and increasingly acute political friction."³

This assessment is still completely accurate at present, now that the years of conference negotiations have finally produced important results and a mutually acceptable draft accord.

From the very beginning of the New York half of the 10th conference session, however, the U.S. stand changed radically. The new American representatives appointed by President Reagan unexpectedly requested all delegations, including their allies, to postpone the session so that the new administration could thoroughly review the draft accord. At this time, American delegate J. Malone made reference to the right of citizens of his country to elect a new administration and "take the responsibility for determining the connection between the draft accord and the policy and goals of the U.S. administration in coming years."⁴ The U.S. delegation then virtually isolated itself from the discussion of remaining unresolved issues, which was objectively supposed to stop the talks and all of the conference's work.

In connection with this unprecedented move by the U.S. administration in regard to an important international conference and the draft treaty it had drawn up, the NEW YORK TIMES reported: "For 7 years the delegates appointed by the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations conducted difficult negotiations with 149 other countries to draft an accord. It pertains to such major aspects of sea law as the freedom of sea and air traffic, fishing rights and the deep-sea exploitation of oil, gas and mineral resources of the sea bed. Last year, however, the Republican Party platform included a statement that the conference was ignoring 'U.S. long-range security interests.' Influential congressmen from both parties asked President Reagan to review the provisions of the draft accord. At the end of last week, Deputy Secretary of State W. Clark suddenly dismissed the leading members of the U.S. delegation; some of them heard the news on their way to the conference room. Their successors were instructed to hold up the negotiations 'until the United States has reviewed its policy.'"⁵

One of the initiators of this review, Congressman J. Breaux, announced in an interview in regard to the work of the conference and the draft accord that there were "flaws" in the very basis of this potential agreement and that "it is not in the interest of our national security or our economy." Furthermore, displaying complete contempt for international law, the American congressman made the following reply when he was asked whether the United States could afford to undermine the conclusion of the treaty: "What will we lose? Not much. We are not encountering any serious problems in shipping even without the accord."⁶

Statements against the draft international sea law convention have appeared in the American press, alleging that it is not in the "national interest of the United

States," that it will hurt private property interests, that it will lead to the "collectivization" of sea bed resources, etc. At the same time, the press has not concealed the initiating role of American private companies. "The five largest industrial consortiums, which are ready to begin mining strategic materials from the ocean floor, regard President Reagan's recent decision about the additional review of the draft sea law convention instead of its immediate approval as a great victory for their side," the NEW YORK TIMES stated. In addition, NEWSWEEK remarked that "American mining companies such as Kennecott and U.S. Steel object to the provisions in the treaty in regard to the international sea law organ, as its functioning could limit production and require American companies to sell it advanced technology."⁷

This press campaign and Washington's official silence about the essence and goals of its position suggested to participants of the 10th session that what lies behind all of this is not a desire to examine the draft accord in detail, but a new policy aimed at the fundamental revision and scrapping of some important provisions in the total sea law "package," which were agreed upon after many years of extremely intense efforts by all conference participants, including the United States.

Conference participants' suspicions grew even stronger when statements made by the American delegation indicated that the Reagan Administration's "review" could take a long time and that the United States would not be prepared to take part in negotiations even after the period of adjournment, at the second half of the 10th conference session. This created the danger that the text of the convention might not be adopted in 1981 and that this important act would be postponed indefinitely.

According to statements by representatives of regional groups at the 14 April 1981 meeting of the conference General Committee, however, the absolute majority of delegations are firmly convinced that the negotiations must be concluded and the draft accord must be adopted by a consensus in 1981, and they believe that this is a real possibility.

Agreeing with this opinion of the overwhelming majority of conference participants, the Soviet delegation leveled valid criticism at the position of the U.S. delegation. In particular, the Soviet statement noted that the U.S. delegation's disregard for the conference decision adopted with its participation was tantamount to opposing the conclusion of the negotiations at the 10th session and that the American delegation was now taking the same stand in regard to the extended session in August. Furthermore, it did not clarify the statement that the United States still feels the need for an international treaty that would establish international legal standards of cooperation by states in the peaceful use of the seas and their resources and that would represent an important factor in the consolidation of peace and law and order on the seas. The clarification of this matter by the U.S. delegation is all the more necessary now that statements by fairly authoritative U.S. spokesmen have implied that the American side is now adhering to a completely different policy in this area.⁸

The overwhelming majority of states, representing various socioeconomic systems, and all regional groups regard the draft accord as a mutually acceptable compromise on the regulation of basic problems in sea law. Founded on the most important principles and standards of contemporary international law, the draft does not

discard the major principles and standards that have been established during centuries of state practices in the world ocean and does not repeal the Geneva conventions of 1958, which reinforced existing principles and standards governing territorial waters, the continental shelf and the open seas. But it does have important distinctive features which make this stage in the codification and progressive development of sea law a truly historic one.

In the first place, this draft is all-encompassing, covering all world ocean problems and resolving them in a "package."

In the second place, it establishes a system of law which considers the interests of the main groups of states and will promote the consolidation of peace and cooperation on the seas.

In the third place, it develops and clarifies traditional principles and standards of sea law, some of which have been considerably reworked; it specifies the spheres of their spatial and functional application.

In the fourth place, the draft accord envisages the creation of such new and important institutions as the 200-mile coastal economic zone, the waters of archipelago states, the international sea bed zone beyond the continental shelf and a single system for the settlement of disputes in various areas of world ocean utilization. These institutions are not stipulated in traditional sea law or the Geneva conventions of 1958.

In the fifth place, the draft accord establishes a single legal system governing activity in various parts of the seas and spheres of the world maritime economy and thereby lays the basis for a guaranteed ecological balance and the coordinated use and preservation of sea and ocean biological and mineral resources. Therefore, it answers the vital needs of the present generation and is in the long-range interest of future generations.

Some U.S. circles, however, have a different view of the draft accord and conference prospects. The need for this accord is being questioned on the grounds that the traditional law of the sea is quite sufficient, according to these circles, to cover the exploitation of sea bed resources beyond the continental shelf.

The assumption that the standards of traditional sea law are sufficient for today's purposes is a denial of the objective development of sea law and a unilateral approach to its interpretation and enforcement. The most important principles and standards of existing sea law (treaties and general law), as mentioned above, represent the essential basis of the draft accord. In light of the requirements of our day, however, existing law suffers from serious omissions and defects. It cannot and will not provide precise answers for new and urgent questions arising as a result of the unprecedented expansion and intensification of the activities of states in the world ocean and the growing severity of resource and ecological problems connected with the use of sea and ocean expanses.

The recognition of this fact is not in any way intended to undermine existing sea law. On the contrary, its complete codification and progressive development, the results of which are recorded in the draft convention, will expand the bases and

heighten the effectiveness of existing sea law. In this new form, it will be the instrument regulating not only traditional activity, but also the present maritime relations of states in all their complexity and diversity. For example, the Geneva conventions did not limit the width of territorial waters, did not specify the outer boundary of the continental shelf, did not contain sufficiently precise and consistent statements about international flights, etc.

These significant gaps were used by some states for the arbitrary expansion of the boundaries of territorial waters and the continental shelf and as justification for illegal attempts to establish their own jurisdiction in parts of the open seas and international shipping lanes. The dangerous process of unilateral actions and claims on the part of some littoral states in recent years has grown to such a degree that it now represents attempts to actually divide and conquer huge maritime expanses.

The Third UN Sea Law Conference is supposed to eliminate these flaws and solve new problems in the sphere of sea law. The draft international convention prepared at this conference establishes a 12-mile territorial zone, specifies the outer boundary of the continental shelf and guarantees free and unimpeded passage and flight across international straits. This alone is enough to prove the history-making significance of the agreements that were reached.

But the draft accord also solves a number of other problems mentioned above, such as the 200-mile economic zone, the status of archipelago state waters, the international sea bed zone beyond the continental shelf, the creation of an international organ in charge of the sea bed, a system for the exploitation of sea bed resources, etc.

Voices are frequently heard in the United States, asserting that the unilateral declaration of coastal fishing and economic zones up to 200 nautical miles wide in recent years by many littoral states has established corresponding legal standards.

But this line of reasoning will not stand up to serious criticism because such unilateral laws and acts by various littoral states do not lead to the creation of a unified system of laws governing the world ocean, but are directed at establishing a "piece-meal system" and lead to the division and conquest of maritime expanses and resources. Furthermore, they are obviously contrary to existing sea law because they undermine its fundamental principle--the freedom of the open seas. Finally, they do not reflect the process by which the interests of various groups of states are coordinated. This means that the main condition for the recognition of international legal standards, general or treaty, is lacking--the approval of their content by states.

Without this kind of approval not one unilateral law, declaring a particular fishing or economic zone, can be recognized as international law. It can only serve as a temporary measure until a convention is adopted, and only to the degree that it is consistent with the provisions of the draft convention, which reflect the agreements reached by states. But these agreements are combined in a single "package" and cannot be taken out of the draft convention. This would disrupt other agreed-upon provisions because the recognition of the 200-mile economic zone

and the compromise laws governing it was accomplished through compromises on other basic issues.

This means that, from the standpoint of existing sea law, the U.S. act on the 200-mile fishing zone and other unilateral acts of this kind by any state cannot, either alone or collectively, serve as grounds for announcing the establishment of conventional international legal standards. Furthermore, if the conference should be disrupted and the adoption of the accord should be sabotaged, according to existing sea law all such acts can be considered to have no international judicial force.

In recent years, one popular thesis making the rounds of American circles is the idea that American private companies have the right, in accordance with the freedom of the open seas, to engage in the prospecting and exploitation of sea bed resources beyond the continental shelf regardless of, and in spite of, the system of laws worked out at the conference to govern this activity. "From the standpoint of U.S. law," the American act on off-shore mineral resources of 28 June 1980 states, "the working and commercial mining of the mineral resources of the sea bed represent open sea freedoms."⁹

In his book on international law pertaining to the exploitation of sea bed resources, American jurist R. Pietrowski argues that the exploitation of sea bed resources beyond the shelf is consistent with common law, which has long permitted the hunting and mining of various biological and mineral sea bed resources (crab, oysters, pearls, coral, coal and others), even before there were no standards governing the continental shelf. Furthermore, he believes that although the Geneva convention of 1958 on the open seas does not list the freedoms of the open seas (Article 2) or mention the freedom to exploit sea bed resources, it does envisage "other freedoms recognized by the general principles of international law," which he believes include this freedom.¹⁰

Many countries do not agree with this broad interpretation of the principle of freedom of the open seas, however. A group of legal experts from the developing countries (the "Group of 77") stressed that the "common principle of freedom of the open seas is not an absolute principle and does not apply to the exploitation of the sea bed and ocean floor beyond the bounds of national jurisdiction because states were incapable of conducting this kind of exploitation at the time when this principle was established."¹¹ According to the developing countries, the legal status of the sea bed and its mineral resources, the bases of which are laid in the declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly on 17 December 1970 in regard to the principles regulating the sea bed and ocean floor and their resources outside the bounds of national jurisdiction, "is the status of the indivisible and inalienable common heritage of mankind, which can be prospected and exploited for the good of all mankind." Only the international system of laws specified in the general accord will regulate the activities of states and their companies in the prospecting and exploitation of sea bed resources.¹²

This view was corroborated by the foreign ministers of the members of the "Group of 77" in a resolution censuring unilateral legislation regarding the exploitation of sea bed resources of 27 October 1979: "Any unilateral measures, legislation and agreements regarding the exploitation of sea bed resources and applying to a limited number of states are illegal and violate the firmly established and imperative standards of international law."¹³

The socialist countries also censured such unilateral acts, particularly on the part of the United States, and did not support the legal doctrine lying at their basis, regarding the freedom to prospect and exploit sea bed resources outside the international sea bed zone determined at the conference.¹⁴

The draft accord provides a reply to the question about the relationship between the principle of freedom of the open seas and the laws governing the prospecting and exploitation of resources in the international sea bed zone. In addition to recording the basic freedoms of the open seas, it specifies the principles and standards of the general behavior and cooperation of states in the international sea bed zone and establishes a legal system for prospecting and exploitation by states and by an international organ. The freedom of the open seas, according to the draft accord, does not include the freedom to prospect and exploit sea bed resources, but represents the basis of the general legal status of the zone. No one state can extend its sovereignty or sovereign rights to the zone or its resources. It is open to all states, to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Activity within this zone will be performed for the good of all mankind and only in accordance with the provisions of the draft accord. Calling the international zone and its resources the "common heritage of mankind," the draft accord specifies important principles and standards, envisaging the right of states and the international organ to exploit sea bed resources, prohibits the monopolization of this activity and envisages its efficient development with a view to the freedom of the open seas and the needs and interests of all states.¹⁵

After the Reagan Administration took office, the groups believing that the draft accord is not of benefit to the United States because it gives more privileges to the developing and socialist countries than to America and its allies, acquired much more influence in U.S. ruling circles. They also believe that several of its provisions are inconsistent with the strategic interests and goals of the American Government and the interests of private American companies. These statements do not reflect the actual state of affairs and represent an extremely biased and unobjective interpretation of the compromises recorded in the draft accord. These arguments are inapplicable to the codification of existing legal standards in the draft convention because this part of the draft simply records what has already been recognized and is in force. As for the principles and standards which amplify existing law, their provisions reflect mutually acceptable compromises, a "package deal" between the three main political groups of states: the socialist countries, the developing states and the United States and other Western states. It also represents the interests of other groups: littoral states, countries with no access to the sea, "territorialist states," countries with an extensive continental shelf and others.

The United States and its Western allies took an active part in these talks and consented to the compromises along with other groups of states, proceeding from their own interests and a realistic assessment of the state of affairs. Frankly speaking, we have every reason to say that the draft convention is of greater benefit, and not less, to the United States and other Western countries than to many other participants in the talks, primarily in the important new provisions pertaining to world ocean resource jurisdiction.

The Soviet Union and a number of other states made a significant compromise, for example, when they consented to the 200-mile economic zone in certain regions of

the open seas which were their traditional fishing areas. The United States did not lose anything from this but actually received unilateral advantages and benefits from the recognition of resource jurisdiction in the 200-mile economic zones in the draft accord.

Another example is the compromise that was reached on the continental shelf. It was precisely the United States and its Western allies which were insisting on their right to the broadest possible strip of shelf with its potential oil and gas reserves. Who did this benefit? We should recall that the Soviet Union and several socialist countries favored a more limited outer shelf boundary--for example, along the depth line (isobath) of 500 meters.

The Soviet Union and a number of other countries, in contrast to the United States, made significant concessions when they agreed to the draft accord provisions in regard to the 200-mile economic zones, the outer boundaries of the continental shelf and other provisions for the sake of reaching an agreement on the entire draft convention.

The draft standards regulating navigation, sea lanes and communications in various parts of the world ocean do not restrict U.S. interests either.

On the basis of the geographic fact that the shores of the United States are washed by the waters of two oceans while the territory of the USSR is surrounded by inland and polar seas, some American authors have reached the invalid conclusion that free and unimpeded navigation and maritime communications are supposedly more beneficial to the USSR than to the United States.¹⁶ In fact, these fundamental premises of the draft--the guarantee of free and unimpeded sea and air traffic through and across international straits and the waters of archipelago states, including naval traffic, the 12-mile limit on territorial waters, the protection of the rights and interests of international shipping in the economic zone and others--were all part of the negotiation "package," without which it would have been impossible to regulate other legal matters pertaining to the world ocean. The constructive efforts of many states participating in the conference essentially led to a situation in which the international community made concessions to littoral countries by recognizing their jurisdiction over resources and thereby guaranteed that the draft accord would record the principles and standards regulating unimpeded navigation in various regions. This is how the foundations on which world trade and transportation rest, the bases of the trade and communications of various countries and continents, were preserved.

The conference provided an opportunity to block the territorial claims of some countries and their attempts to control world communications, and this is one of the important positive results of the draft accord for all countries, including the United States. A state cannot ignore or denigrate this major victory for its side by indulging in jealous calculations of the imaginary victories of other countries.

The benefits gained at the conference by the United States are in no way less impressive than those gained by the USSR and other countries. This has even been acknowledged by many Americans. A NEW YORK TIMES editorial entitled "Don't Sink the Sea Law Treaty" said: "The treaty's guarantee of the unimpeded passage of

naval ships and commercial vessels through strategic straits is an important advantage for the United States. These and other favorable provisions required concessions.... The abandonment of this treaty now would mean the loss of a rare opportunity to extend the force of law and prevent countless conflicts in coming decades."¹⁷

Senator Javits, who made a special study of the freedom of navigation, remarked in one of his Senate speeches: "Our support of free navigation is due to economic and military interests. Each year ocean vessels carry cargo worth much more than 150 billion dollars to and from the United States. Around 35 billion, or even more, represents the cost of foreign oil, on which we have unfortunately been increasingly dependent. Restrictions on the free transport of this cargo, whether within the 200-mile economic zone or in international straits, could lead to a tremendous increase in our expenditures and, in some cases, could have the negative effect of promoting commodity shortages and delaying shipments. In the same way, U.S. military and defense interests depend on the mobility of our naval forces, both conventional and strategic. Those who assert that U.S. interests can best be protected on a temporary and bilateral basis and upheld, if necessary, by our naval forces do not, in my opinion, understand the economic and political realities of our world."¹⁸

In December 1980, 13 American congressmen sent a letter to President-Elect Reagan, listing their objections to a number of draft accord provisions regulating the exploitation of world ocean resources. In particular, they wrote that "the Third World will dominate...the international organ and will be strongly influenced by the Soviet bloc."¹⁹

These references to the "dominion" and "influence" of any country within the new international organ do not reflect the actual nature of the compromises that were reached. The agreements on the composition and functions of the council and assembly and on the procedure for making decisions within them are intended to protect the interests of all the main groups of states, including the Western countries. The chief executive organ will have a representative composition and a decision-making procedure which will not allow any one group of countries to dominate the proceedings (in particular, it proposes the consensus procedure or a majority of three-fourths or two-thirds, depending on the importance and complexity of questions). Furthermore, the wording about the automatic ratification of contracts in the council could be viewed as a major, or even excessive, concession to the Western countries.

Of course, the compromise wording of the draft accord on these matters differs from the initial proposals of the United States and the Western countries, which were striving for unilateral privileges and benefits at the expense of other groups of countries. It is obvious, however, that they provide for the optimal balance of interests in general and protect the rights and interests of the United States and its allies as much as the interests of other countries.

There is also no basis for the statement made by the authors of this letter that the USSR and other Eastern European socialist countries have been guaranteed 3 seats on the 36-member council, while the United States and its allies have no guaranteed seats. In fact, the wording of the draft does not even mention the

USSR, and the mention of special categories for two socialist countries was included in the provision regarding the composition of the council to guarantee the minimum representation of the group of socialist countries, and not to offer a privilege. The compromise wording also guarantees permanent representation for the six major Western countries--the main exploiters of concretions and importers of concretion metals; in other words, the United States and its chief allies. On the whole, the description of the council membership guarantees the representation of eight or nine Western countries and Japan, which gives them an advantage. It should be noted that the United States and the other Western countries were the ones who objected to the mention of the "Western countries" in the wording, as this might have restricted their representation.

As for the congressmen's complaints about the cost of setting up an international enterprise, the production limit, the transmission of technology and so forth, it should be stressed that the draft provisions on these matters represent a concession to the developing countries. In exchange, this group of countries agreed to recognize a parallel system of resource exploitation, giving states access to sea bed resources, and to include other important provisions insisted upon by the United States and other countries in the draft accord. Furthermore, the compromise provisions differ considerably from the initial ones.

For example, the international enterprise will be based on equal participation by all states and the financing of its first project (and not all of its activity) will be based on repayable loans (and not compulsory dues). The annual limit on the production of metals from concretions is intended to guarantee the development of the world economy as a whole and consider the interests of those who exploit the metals (nickel, cobalt, copper and manganese) in the sea as well as producers on land.

"The system of regulations envisaged in the accord," said E. Richardson, who was the head of the U.S. delegation at the conference in past years, "will guarantee American companies access to resources.... There could be different opinions as to whether the regulations governing the exploitation of sea bed resources are good or not. I think they are. Compromises were made on fundamental issues."²⁰

Another prominent American expert, Ambassador J. Aldrich, who was the deputy head of the U.S. delegation and participated directly in the negotiations, addressed the National Association of Manufacturers on 8 December 1980 in San Francisco and analyzed in detail the draft provisions regarding the system of sea bed resource exploitation, the production limit, access rights and other matters. He cogently proved that because these provisions are compromises, they are fully in the interest of the United States and the American business community and that without a new all-encompassing legal system, the exploitation of sea bed resources "will simply become another victim of a more chaotic and dangerous world."²¹

After examining the various objections raised by the opponents of the draft accord, it is obvious that they are far-fetched, have no legal basis, do not consider the realities of the present day and the course of the conference negotiations and are not even in the interest of the United States. A pertinent warning was sounded by NEWSWEEK magazine when it predicted that "the United States might have the most to lose" if the conference should be disrupted by the Reagan Administration's stand.²²

At the second half of the 10th session, the conference rejected the nihilistic U.S. approach and passed a resolution ascribing official status to the present text of the accord. It should be adopted at its 11th session, planned for March and April 1982.

It is obvious that the draft convention, representing the result of many years of negotiations involving literally all states, signifies the triumph of reason and cooperation by states, goodwill and mutual concessions and compromises. It is intended to dispel mistrust and hostility in the spheres of international political and economic relations in the world ocean which could be the scene of the most serious conflicts, strengthen cooperation by states and become a significant element of international peace. All states and peoples and future generations need a treaty to regulate the urgent problems connected with the world ocean. They need it from every standpoint--political, economic, legal, scientific, psychological and humanitarian.

FOOTNOTES

1. See the articles in our magazine: No 2, 1975, pp 23-32; No 12, 1979, pp 26-37--Editor's note.
2. Doc UN A/Conf 62/BUR, 13/Rev. (1).
3. "Address by the Honorable H. Kissinger, Secretary of State, Before the American Bank Association Annual Convention," Montreal, August 1975, p 3.
4. "Statement by James L. Malone, U.S. Representative to the 10th Session of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in Plenary," N.Y., 17 March 1981, pp 1-2.
5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 15 March 1981.
6. Ibid.
7. TIME, 23 March 1981, p 12; THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19 March 1981; 7 April 1981; NEWSWEEK, 23 March 1981, p 36.
8. Doc UN A/Conf 62/SR 149, p 5.
9. "Public Law 96-283," 28 June 1980, 94 stat 554.
10. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 14 December 1979, pp S18543-S18544.
11. Doc UN A/Conf 62/77, p 5.
12. Ibid., p 6.
13. Doc UN A/34/611, p 2.
14. "The Third UN Law of the Sea Conference. Official Reports," vol XI, N.Y., 1980, p 7.

15. Doc UN A/Conf 62/L, 78, pp 59-70.
16. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1978, pp 377-380; also Summer 1981, pp 121-138.
17. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 March 1981.
18. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 14 December 1979, pp S18545, S18546.
19. "Remarks of the Honorable John B. Breaux Before the American Oceanic Organization," 18 February 1981, Wash., 1981, pp 2, 8-15.
20. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 15 March 1981.
21. CURRENT POLICY, 9 December 1980, pp 2-4.
22. NEWSWEEK, 23 March 1981, p 36.

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CSO: 1803/6

CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN CANADA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 40-48

[Article by V. Ye. Shilo]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CONFERENCE AT QUEBEC 1944

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 49-58

[Article by A. I. Konovalov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1803/6

THE PROTEST MOVEMENT IS GROWING

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 59-68

[Article by I. A. Geyevskiy, Ye. N. Yershova and S. A. Chervonnaya]

[Text] A huge demonstration was held in Washington on 19 September. The U.S. capital had not seen this kind of massive, widely representative demonstration by the common American people since the time of the famous march on Washington initiated by Martin Luther King in 1963.

This demonstration was initiated by the AFL-CIO, which decided to organize it in connection with the widespread dissatisfaction of the working public with the Reagan Administration's domestic policy after numerous appeals for a protest march by local, regional and sectorial labor unions. The idea of the march was supported by various public organizations: associations of black Americans, women, youth, senior citizens and many others. Representatives of the working public throughout the country gathered in Washington. The total number of participants, according to official sources, exceeded 250,000.

The demonstration in the U.S. capital was the most significant sociopolitical event of recent years. It testifies that the American masses have correctly understood the class essence of the administration's economic program, aimed at protecting the interests of big capital. The demonstration reflected changes in public opinion: It would have been unthinkable at the beginning of this year, when the administration's program was first announced. At that time, most Americans felt, according to public opinion polls, that it was "fair" to all classes and social groups. But the new budget and the thoroughly unfair tax reform showed that the administration is protecting the interests of the American rich and is burdening the underprivileged with new difficulties and deprivations.

The march on Washington was the culminating point of the previous development of mass democratic movements. They are now much more active than in recent years. This process is an uneven one because it is still affected by the organizational fragmentation and ideological weakness of many movements. They have to act under difficult conditions, at a time when the American population is being subjected to ideological brainwashing by conservative circles. In recent years, for example, reactionary propaganda has convinced the majority of Americans of the need for higher military expenditures: In the last 10 years the number of people favoring increased military expenditures has risen from 8 percent of the total population

to 51 percent. There has also been a rise in the number of Americans advocating "military superiority" to the USSR, the use of armed forces to "protect" Western Europe, etc.

These changes in the views of many Americans are the result of an ideological offensive by rightwing forces, which have been encouraged by centrists and even by many liberals. The fact that many Americans now share these views can only be assessed correctly if their motives are analyzed. This kind of analysis proves that the motives of the reactionary elite and the average Americans do not coincide at all: Whereas the former are motivated by the selfish desire to grow rich on defense contracts and to carry out aggressive global plans, the latter are motivated by their learned fear of the "Soviet threat," frustration connected with the falsely interpreted "humiliation" of the United States, etc. Even Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger called the balance in favor of the present growth of military spending a "delicate" one.

The fact that the increase in military appropriations has been accomplished through cuts in social programs is already influencing the thinking of many Americans by showing them the actual consequences of an arms race.

Various segments of democratic forces are trying to take a discerning look at the main aspects of the administration's economic program and find alternative solutions to domestic problems. The offensive launched by big capital and the state on the standard of living, social gains and democratic rights of the masses is encountering increasing resistance.

Important changes are taking shape in the labor movement. The election of Ronald Reagan, the Republican victories in congressional elections and the election defeats of many liberal "friends of labor" in both houses of Congress have obviously upset the union leadership, and the new administration's very first steps, especially its economic program, proved that the President and the conservative Congress intend to pursue a frankly pro-monopoly, anti-labor policy line. Although the AFL-CIO executive committee agreed that the time had come to curb inflation, increase employment and heighten labor productivity, it also expressed "disagreement with the view that the President's proposed measures will lead to the attainment of these goals." The executive committee has called these measures "unfair." In particular, the AFL-CIO has criticized the planned cuts in federal appropriations for social programs and the draft tax reform, as something that will benefit the rich and the corporations and will injure the poor. "Reagan's proposals," the labor organization announced, "will require considerable sacrifices from those who have little, and will give even more to those who already have a great deal." Chairman Kirkland of the AFL-CIO announced that the working public would "not tolerate a return" to the "injustices of the past." Chairman D. Fraser of the United Automobile and Aerospace Workers called Reagan's draft budget the "offspring of a poor economic policy and an even worse social policy." The antisocial nature of the administration's program has been systematically exposed in the labor union press. It has helped the unions establish contact with various democratic public organizations. The influence of labor unions within the Democratic Party is growing; for example, they are expected to take a more active part in the 1982 campaign. The unions are now represented more broadly in the party leadership. Union leaders and members of the Democratic Party National Committee have publicly

censured the Conservative Democratic Caucus, which consists of 44 congressmen who support the administration's planned cuts in social programs, and have called upon Democratic leaders to protect the interests of the "future victims of Reagan's economic program--workers, minorities, senior citizens and the poor." This appeal, however, has been unanswered by the leaders of the Democratic Party in Congress.

The unions' disagreement with the passive stance of many Democratic Party spokesmen was expressed at a session of the AFL-CIO executive committee on 3-7 August of this year. "Some of our friends," Kirkland said at the session, "have told us that this is not the time to mobilize forces to resist counterrevolution.... But we will be betraying our obligation to our union members if we stand by and watch calmly as the counterrevolutionaries unite their ranks against the workers."

The reformist leaders of the American labor unions have not used this kind of language for a long time, probably not since the 1930's.

When we note these signs of the revival of the central labor organization's activity and its attempts to resist reactionary pressure, we must also take note of the inconsistency of its leadership. The defective nature of the ideological and political views of rightwing union leaders is particularly apparent now, at this time of an all-out offensive by the monopolies. The belligerent anti-Sovietism and anti-communism of the union leaders are keeping them from challenging the administration's globalist foreign policy line of confrontation with the USSR and arms race escalation. It is true that the demonstrations against the administration's sharp cuts in social programs forced the AFL-CIO executive committee to cautiously express its disapproval of "higher military spending at the expense of vitally important social programs" this August.

The administration's anti-labor policy naturally brought it into acute conflict with the American labor movement and motivated the reformist leaders of the AFL-CIO to make changes in their customary tactics and methods of struggle. These leaders joined the picket lines of the striking air traffic controllers. The head of the AFL-CIO, L. Kirkland, described the administration's measures to stifle the air controllers' strike as "crude and brutal reprisals." The labor unions realize that these draconian measures are only the beginning of a broad-scale attack on the working class. "It is completely obvious," Chairman R. Poli of the striking air traffic controllers' union said, "that the Reagan Administration has chosen the members of our union as a target to demonstrate how it plans to break up the organized labor movement."

Much of the potential mass base of the opposition to the Reagan Administration's domestic and foreign policy consists of blacks, Latinos and other ethnic minorities. Because most of the members of these minorities are also members of the most unprivileged strata of the U.S. population, they depend on social programs more than other segments of the population and rely on government assistance in the resolution of the problems they encounter.

The abovementioned changes in public opinion have not affected non-white Americans as much as whites. There is a significant gap between the views of whites and coloreds. Most colored Americans still have liberal views. Even according to bourgeois sources, for example, only 15 percent of the blacks polled (in February

1981) adhere to views "right of center," 25 percent are centrists and 44 percent have "leftist" views. Black Americans did not agree with the propaganda about the negative features of "big government." On the contrary, most of them favor the expansion of government social programs. Editor J. Dreyfuss of the black magazine BLACK ENTERPRISE wrote: "Much of what the conservatives say is connected with nostalgia which we do not feel. The days when the so-called democratic system of free enterprise cruelly oppressed the blacks and deprived them of jobs are too vivid in our memory." It is understandable that only 25 percent of the blacks polled (in February 1981) had a positive opinion of Ronald Reagan, as compared to 74 percent of the whites. In reference to black Americans' negative feelings about the Republican administration, the black AFRO-AMERICAN weekly noted in summer of this year: "The blacks are fully aware of what Reagan's program will mean to them. Their general thoughts and feelings are that this program will mean higher prices, cuts in federal aid, increased unemployment, the non-observance of laws on civil rights and the creation of an atmosphere in which reactionary elements and ideologists of the racial supremacy of whites will feel free to do whatever they want."

The same views are characteristic of millions of Latinos, who were deeply disturbed by President Reagan's refusal to meet with representatives of their organizations, his negative attitude toward bilingual study programs and the administration's stand on immigration from the Latin American countries, which could intensify discrimination against the Spanish-speaking inhabitants of the United States.

The administration's economic program has not only heightened the dissatisfaction of ethnic minorities with the policy of the dominant class, but has also motivated them to mobilize their forces to resist the attack on their gains and build up the movement for the rights of non-white Americans for the purpose of regaining the power and political influence it lost in the last decade. According to V. Jordan, the head of the National Urban League, the minorities have "no other alternative but to prepare for a battle to keep reactionary forces from demolishing, with a single blow, the hard-won victories of a stubborn 20-year struggle." A statement issued by the Committee for Chicano Rights says that the increased oppression of Chicanos will unavoidably intensify their resistance.

At a conference in Washington in May, 150 leaders of Indian tribes accused the government of deliberately breaking promises that had been made to the Indians, particularly in connection with the considerable cuts in appropriations for Indian needs. In June representatives of Indian tribes met in Minnesota to work out a program of struggle. The Indian leaders unanimously declared the need to inform world public opinion and international organizations of the policy of genocide toward the Indian population of the United States.

Most non-white Americans realize how hostile conservative policy is to their interests. Their disillusionment with the Democratic Party's ability to solve their problems has not led to any significant increase in the Republican Party's influence with these groups: They are still placing their hopes in leftist liberal groups within the Democratic Party.

The Black Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives is playing an increasingly important sociopolitical role. It has 19 members (2 of whom are from the District

of Columbia and have no voting rights). This is the most active leftist liberal force in the U.S. Congress. To stimulate opposition within the Congress to the administration's planned budget cuts, this faction submitted an alternative draft budget to the House on 17 February. In contrast to the administration's budget, this draft not only preserved existing social programs in full, but also envisaged the considerable expansion of appropriations for social needs by means of sharp cuts in defense allocations. The tax reform proposed by the black congressmen envisaged the significant reduction of the tax burden of low-income and middle-income strata by collecting more taxes from the rich and from corporations. On 6 May the House of Representatives rejected this draft budget after 2 hours of discussion by a vote of 356 to 69. The support the draft received, however, testifies to the ability of the Black Caucus to rally leftist liberal forces in the Congress. The Black Caucus, according to J. Conyers, one of its members, realizes that it must become more active and gain more influence in the present conservative Congress and is striving to gain mass support for its initiatives by taking part in the creation of broad coalitions.

The black congressmen not only oppose the administration's economic policy but also have strong objections to its foreign policy. Washington's new chauvinistic campaign has had much less effect on blacks than on whites. According to a survey conducted by the GUARDIAN newspaper, anti-war feelings among blacks are now "even deeper and more widespread than they were during the war in Vietnam." The non-white American masses are against increases in military spending and the creation of new weapon systems and support the resetting of budget priorities in favor of social expenditures. Their leaders have condemned the provocative campaign stirred up over the events in Poland, want the United States to stop supporting the Salvadoran junta and speak of the danger of turning El Salvador into "another Vietnam." They have sharply criticized the administration's open support of the racist regime in South Africa.

A new type of militant black organization, a united black front, backed up by broad-scale mass activity on the local level, began to take shape in 1979, at the time of the mass demonstrations against racist excesses. In June 1980 the organization took on official status and announced that its ultimate goal was struggle for radical change in the American society and that its immediate goal was the revival of the mass militant organized black movement, acting in conjunction with other progressive forces.

The weakness of the Democratic Party's liberal left wing, the traditional center for the political affiliation of minority organizations, could also heighten the tendency, first noticed in the 1970's, toward independent political action by these organizations. This is attested to by the formation of a national independent black political party at the end of 1980, which hopes to create a "mass anti-capitalist, progressive political organization to defend the interests of black Americans."

The present administration's policy is severely injuring the interests of women, particularly women from low-income strata. Many American women are also opposed to the militaristic policy of the administration. Women's organizations are cooperating actively with anti-war coalitions to campaign for cuts in military spending, to stop the arms race, to put an end to the registration of youth for army service and to prevent the revival of the compulsory draft. At present, however, the

women's movement is experiencing difficulties. An offensive launched by rightist and conservative anti-feminist forces is causing women to lose one conquest after another. Besides this, there is no unity within the movement and this also diminishes its effectiveness.

The Reagan Administration's foreign policy line has also aroused mounting opposition on the part of anti-war organizations. Despite the propaganda campaign about the "Soviet threat," which has been going on for many years in the United States, the American people still want peace and are in favor of talks with the Soviet Union. The results of public opinion polls testify that anti-war feelings are characteristic of many Americans. Although 68 percent of the Americans polled at the beginning of 1981 expressed a willingness to "tighten belts if increased military expenditures can guarantee national security," 60 percent (that is, largely the same people) nevertheless spoke in favor of the policy of detente and the continuation of the strategic arms limitation talks with the USSR. These people represent the potential mass base of the anti-war movement.

Anti-war organizations and leaders are exposing the administration's militaristic campaign. For example, SANE WORLD, the press organ of SANE, one of the largest anti-war organizations, has called the myth of "Soviet strategic superiority" the "most dangerous myth of all times." The leaders of the movement ask Americans to remember that the United States "marched in the nuclear parade for 40 years but did not gain much."

The chief distinctive feature of the peace movement at the present time is the combination of traditional slogans with socioeconomic demands. There is good reason why the issue of budget priorities has become the focal point of the socio-political struggle. In view of the fact that the augmentation of military spending can, according to experts from the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, "only exacerbate the main economic problems" of the United States, it is precisely in the struggle against the administration's economic policy that all of those harmed by this policy can unite on a broad basis. "Our ability to link our demands for cuts in military spending with the efforts of those who are fighting to preserve vitally important rights and social services," SANE WORLD wrote, "will be of decisive significance for the peace movement."

Peace movement activists have stressed the importance of an alliance with the working class. For example, J. Carroll from the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy remarked: "Until we find a way of reaching the working class, until we teach people that there is a connection between the huge expenditures on weapons and the sinking economy, there is little chance of any change in coming years."

Anti-war forces are becoming increasingly aware of the need for more active non-parliamentary forms of struggle; they are also resorting to lobbyism (backed up primarily by the members of the Black Caucus of the U.S. Congress). The first results of this approach are already apparent. In 1981 anti-war coalitions and organizations initiated a number of mass campaigns and a series of demonstrations for the right to work in a peaceful atmosphere, for a moratorium on nuclear weapons, against the registration of youth and the revival of the draft, against the mobile MX missile program and against U.S. intervention in El Salvador.

Furthermore, the tactic of non-violent civil disobedience was once again widely used in all of these campaigns.

The anti-war movement's activists are deeply concerned about its organizational strength. They intend to create a "permanent and broad-based multiconcern coalition" which would be distinguished by closer cohesion and a more precise program than at present. The anti-war press regularly features discussions of strategy and tactics. Nonetheless, until recently the organizational fragmentation, paucity of funds and insufficient access to news media complicated the spread of the influence of anti-war forces in the American society. On the other hand, the American public's serious worries about the future of the world, its desire to prevent a thermonuclear catastrophe and its increasing awareness that this will necessitate cooperation with the USSR are working in favor of American supporters of peace.

After the mighty upsurge of the student movement of the 1960's, the 1970's were marked by apolitical attitudes and conformity on university campuses. According to polls conducted by the American Council on Education, the number of socially active freshmen constantly decreased during this decade. In 1979 only a third of the female students and 43 percent of the males said it was important to keep up with politics (50 percent in 1969) and only half of all the students polled felt the need to "develop a philosophy of life." The majority described their political views as "centrist" and around two-thirds of the male students and more than half of the females said that financial prosperity was important to them (less than half in 1969).

The exacerbation of the economic situation in the country and the related insecurity were the reasons for the change in student views. The student movement lost its status as an influential sociopolitical force. However, although the political climate on the campus became more moderate in general, the possibility of student protest cannot be completely excluded. Some forms of student protest did exist in the 1970's, but they were of a spontaneous and sporadic nature and in most cases were on a limited, local scale. The slight resurgence of student activism in the middle of 1980 was an immediate reaction to the increasing strength of rightwing forces in the country, the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency and the policy of the Republican administration. Protest demonstrations took place at a number of universities. The persons involved in them were mainly politically active, liberal students who were dissatisfied primarily with the growth of rightist authoritarian tendencies within the country, the intensification of militarism and the danger of war and the new administration's open support of the apartheid regime in South Africa and dictatorships in Latin America. The administration's economic program, which envisages cuts in appropriations for educational needs and the curtailment of student financial aid programs, will be of direct detriment to the broad student masses and will widen the mass base of student dissatisfaction.

The administration's economic policy will have a particularly severe effect on the status of young workers, who anticipate the curtailment or cancellation of many vocational training and job placement programs. In response to the announced program of budget cuts, youth groups began to take shape spontaneously in various parts of the United States to fight against cuts in social programs. According to the leader of one of these groups in Utica (New York), L. Hoffman, "President Reagan's proposed cuts in job programs for youth will be catastrophic for

unemployed young people." The activities of these groups are coordinated on the national level by a youth lobby for the right to work, which organized a demonstration by thousands of young people in Washington on 14 April.

The Reagan Administration's economic policy will also injure another large segment of the American population--senior citizens. As a result of the increasing political activity of this group in the last decade and the more intense struggle for the satisfaction of its socioeconomic needs, a mass organized senior citizen movement has taken shape for the first time in U.S. history. Senior citizen organizations are planning a nationwide campaign to, according to a statement by the National Council of Senior Citizens, "repulse the most massive attack ever on the social security program for the aged." The activities of these organizations are widely supported by labor unions. Senior citizen organizations have joined a number of coalitions of democratic forces.

One of the characteristic tendencies in the development of the democratic struggle in recent years has been the increased activity of mass coalitions. Many of them were created in the mid-1970's and now act within the framework of separate movements or unite representatives of various democratic forces. The Republican administration has given their activity new momentum.

The Coalition for a Popular Alternative, which unites around 60 organizations, has stressed the "need for more intense effort to unite the broad spectrum of leftist and progressive forces and create a movement outside the framework of the two-party system." The Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, which unites around 45 organizations, plans to concentrate on struggle against the "rebirth of American militarism and the danger of military intervention" and on the resetting of budget priorities. The Civil Rights Leadership Council, which was mainly created to defend minority gains in the sphere of civil rights, has become much more active and now unites over 500 organizations and groups. It plans to launch a mass campaign for pressure on the U.S. Congress.

New coalitions have also been formed to fight against individual aspects of the administration's economic program. For example, the National Coalition Against Hunger and Cuts in Food Programs has united a number of labor unions and women's, religious and minority organizations. In March another coalition, with a broader objective, was formed. This is the Budget Coalition, which was initiated by labor unions and plans to fight against cuts in budget social expenditures. It has united 157 organizations, including the automobile workers' union, religious and women's organizations, the Federation of American Consumers, the National Council of Senior Citizens, the United States Conference of Mayors, the American Farmers' Association, Americans for Democratic Action and others. This coalition's program is quite indefinite, but it has expressed disagreement with the administration's intention to solve the nation's economic problems at the expense of the American people, especially people with fixed incomes (the poor and pensioners). Its main intention is to exert pressure on the U.S. Congress. The coalition also took an active part in the mass protest demonstration in Washington on 3 May 1981, which was fully supported by more than 500 organizations, including the Communist Party of the United States of America.

Today's coalition is the main form for the unification of U.S. democratic forces, bringing together broad segments of the population to solve specific problems.

However, the weaknesses inherent in the coalition form--insufficient unity of action, the duplication of efforts and, in some cases, conflicts and even struggle between organizations--diminish ability to attain the objectives of democratic movements.

One of the most acute problems is the absence of a tangible political force capable of heading the mass democratic opposition and giving it a precise political program and ideology. This is due to the weakness of the left wing of democratic forces, its ideological fragmentation, the sectarian nature of many of its organizations and the absence of a mass base.

The most active of the social democratic organizations is the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, established in 1973 by distinguished journalist Michael Harrington, the author of "The Other America." The influence of this organization cannot be assessed merely in terms of numbers (around 5,000 members): Around a third of its members are influential labor leaders, some represent the progressive intelligentsia and 50 members are elected officials on various levels of government. The committee opposes the arms race and the creation of new weapon systems and advocates the conclusion of a new agreement on strategic offensive weapons with the USSR. It has pointedly criticized the present Washington administration's economic program and favors "social control" over business, the expansion of federal social programs and changes in tax policy in the interest of the working public. In its daily activity, the committee leadership emphasizes struggle for the leftist liberal reorientation of the Democratic Party and has special hopes for the next party convention, in 1982. The committee's activities, however, are weakened by the absence of a specific economic program aimed at limiting the power of monopolies and by the influence of Zionist, anticomunist and anti-Soviet elements within the committee.

The only consistent and integral position is that of the American Communists, who have appealed for a "mass protest movement which will force the politicians to listen to the demands of the working public" and "smash the monopolies' offensive on the concessions won by the working public after many years of struggle." The Communist Party is actively involved in the work of a number of democratic coalitions and takes part in the demonstrations they organize. It lays special stress on work with labor, both organized and unorganized. At the beginning of June it distributed a "Special Letter to Industrial Workers, Employed and Unemployed," which clearly and concisely argued the need for maximum worker unity in the struggle against the reactionary onslaught, the exposure of the opportunistic behavior of rightwing labor leaders and the eradication of racist and chauvinist biases which undermine the unity of the labor movement.

The youth branch of the Communist Party of the United States of America, the Young Workers' Alliance, is trying to play an active role in the organization of youth protests. A program of struggle against the reactionary onslaught was set forth at its fifth national congress at the end of June.

Sociopolitical life in the United States is presently undergoing a complex period of adjustment. It is being influenced by factors which sometimes contradict one another--domestic and foreign, long-range and short-range, economic and political, mass psychological.... All of these sociopolitical processes in the nation, however, clearly reflect one main feature--the increasingly distinct outlines of opposition and growing confrontation between the supporters and opponents of administration policy.

The Republicans are making every effort to postpone the payment of their main bill--their promise to revitalize the economy. Officials are now more likely to admit that the economy is still "ailing" and that it will be a long time before there is any change for the better. The absence of tangible success on the economic front could undermine the bases of Republican political strategy. At the same time, the hypothetical improvement of economic conditions, regardless of its nature and causes, will not automatically change the minds of the majority of workers and other segments of the laboring public and put them on the side of the Republican Party. The fact is that big capital, backed up by Republican support, has launched a fierce attack on the standard of living and union rights of the working class; in particular, it is paving the way for the passage of new antilabor, antidemocratic laws. The average American is becoming increasingly aware of the actual, pro-monopoly content of this economic policy, which is contrary to the vital interests of the laboring masses. Under these conditions, the encouragement of chauvinistic feelings and the promises to improve the financial status of the population are not as effective as they were in 1980, when they brought the Republicans a victory.

Rhetoric, emotions and expectations always dominate the atmosphere during campaigns, but today the realities of life, the actual behavior of government leaders and the way in which this behavior affects the status of various social groups are more important. The state-monopolistic attack on the social rights, interests and gains of the masses, conducted under conservative Republican banners, is arousing increasing public dissatisfaction and protest.

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FOR PEACEFUL SPACE

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 68-73

[Article by S. G. Stashevskiv]

[Text] The idea that the militarization of outer space must be prevented was set forth by the Soviet Union long ago and was reaffirmed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev in the Kremlin on 17 April 1981 when he conferred high honors on the Soviet and Mongolian cosmonauts who took part in the joint orbital flight. "May the boundless expanses of space," L. I. Brezhnev stressed, "be free and clear of weapons of any type. We hope that our collective efforts will lead to the attainment of a great and humanitarian goal--the exclusion of the possibility of the militarization of outer space."

This proposal was amplified and made more specific when the discussion of a treaty to prohibit the placement of weapons of any type in outer space was included on the agenda of the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly, which began on 15 September, at the request of the USSR. The USSR submitted a draft of this treaty. A letter sent by Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko to the UN secretary general in this connection stresses that the Soviet Union "wants space to remain free and clear of all weapons forever, so that it does not become a new arms race arena and source of friction between states."

Throughout the history of space travel, the Soviet Union has headed the struggle of peace-loving forces to limit the military use of space and to turn space into a zone of exclusively peaceful cooperation by states. These many years of efforts were continued when the conclusion of the abovementioned treaty was proposed.

Article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty envisages the promise of participating states "not to put vehicles carrying weapons of any type in orbit around the earth, not to install such weapons on heavenly bodies and not to place such weapons in outer space by any other means, including manned space shuttles of the existing type and of other types that might be developed by participating states in the future." It also proposes that signatories pledge "not to assist, encourage or incite" individual states, groups of states or international organizations to take such actions. The Soviet draft envisages a pledge "not to destroy, injure, disrupt the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space vehicles" put in orbit by other signatories in accordance with the terms of the treaty.

Other articles of the draft treaty record the pledge of signatories to use outer space in strict accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, in the interest of maintaining world peace and security and developing international cooperation and mutual understanding.

By proposing the conclusion of this treaty, the Soviet Union is striving to set up a reliable international legal barrier to prevent the militarization of outer space and exclude outer space from the sphere of the arms race.

At the very beginning of the space age, in 1958, the USSR submitted a proposal to the 13th Session of the UN General Assembly, in a memorandum on disarmament dated 15 March 1958, envisaging a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes. All subsequent Soviet initiatives could have already brought about the radical and complete solution of the problem of demilitarizing space if they had been implemented. The progress toward this goal, however, has involved many stages in the limitation of the possibility of using space for military purposes, and each time there has been vigorous resistance by the United States and several other states. Through the efforts of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and all peace-loving forces in the world, a number of international agreements have been concluded to limit the use of outer space for military purposes in some respects.

The first such international treaty was concluded at the initiative of the USSR and went into effect in 1963. This was the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. It prohibited all nuclear tests in outer space.

The Treaty on the Principles of the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which went into effect in 1967, was the next step in the prevention of the militarization of outer space. It prohibited the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space and imposed a total ban on the use of the moon and other celestial bodies for military purposes, including the establishment of military bases--installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapon and the conduct of military maneuvers. These basic provisions were developed in the agreement on the activities of states on the moon and other celestial bodies, recommended for signature by all states at the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1979. The agreement extends the basic provisions regarding the prevention of the militarization of the moon and other celestial bodies of the solar system to the area surrounding the moon.

The 1977 convention prohibiting the use of means to influence the environment for military or other hostile purposes was also a positive step in preventing the militarization of space. The signatories of this convention pledged not to deliberately control natural processes to destroy, damage or harm other states. This international agreement also covers methods to influence space close to the earth for military purposes and the use of space to influence the earth's environment.

Besides this, some restrictions on the military use of outer space were envisaged in strategic arms limitation agreements between the USSR and United States, the main space powers. For example, in accordance with the treaty on the limitation of ABM systems (1972), the USSR and United States pledged not to develop, use or deploy space-based ABM systems or components, and the SALT II treaty, which has

still not gone into effect through the fault of Washington, envisages the same kind of pledge with respect to means of putting nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, including semiorbital missiles.

The Soviet Union has also taken steps in other areas to restrict the possibility of the military use of outer space even more. A Soviet proposal on the prohibition of the development and establishment of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction has been the subject of discussion in the United Nations and the Disarmament Commission since 1975. The United States and its NATO allies have refused to take part in businesslike talks on this matter. It is apparent, however, that possible agreements in this area could also cover the new types and systems of weapons that might be intended for use in space or through space. The Soviet Union has repeatedly expressed its willingness to limit or prohibit any type of weapon, but naturally on the condition that the other side reciprocate and that no one's security be imperiled. The Soviet-U.S. talks on antisatellite systems in 1978 and 1979, which came to a standstill through the fault of the American side, also represent a way of limiting the military use of space.

All of these international agreements impose substantial restrictions on the military use of outer space, but these restrictions are not total. No sufficiently effective international legal barrier has been set up to keep the arms race from spreading to outer space: Above all, there is no ban on the placement and use of weapons in space if these weapons cannot be classified as weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the danger of the militarization of outer space still exists, and now that the United States is taking steps to extend the arms race directly to outer space, this danger is even greater.

Some Washington circles regard space as some kind of "absolute position," the conqueror of which will automatically rule the world. "Whoever manages to seize control over space, this main arena of all future wars, will change the balance of power to such a decisive degree that this will be tantamount to the establishment of world dominion," remarked BUSINESS WEEK on 4 June 1979. The tone of the entire U.S. space program is set by military agencies. "Space exploration was given momentum by the interest of military leaders, and they have no intention of missing the opportunities it promises them," said T. Pfister, head of the NASA space program development division in the Kennedy Space Flight Center in March 1981.

Pentagon expenditures on military space research far exceed NASA expenditures. According to a report in the 27 April 1981 issue of NEWSWEEK, the Pentagon plans to spend 5.8 billion dollars on this research just in 1982, and this does not include around 3 billion dollars earmarked for secret military space programs. These funds will be used mainly in the development of new space weapons, which have been the main emphasis of American military space research in recent years. This would mean the creation of an entire arsenal of military space installations to be used for combat directly in outer space and for the destruction of land and air targets from space.

In this connection, the Pentagon is now concentrating on the perfection of the new space transport system--the manned space shuttle. The first "Columbia" spaceship of this system was launched in April 1981 with two astronauts on board. The shuttle program is largely subordinated to the interests of military agencies.

Reports in the U.S. press have noted that financial difficulties would have kept the shuttle from ever getting off the ground if it had not been for the Pentagon's help. It is true that the original NASA allocation of 5.1 billion dollars for the development of the "Columbia" was considerably supplemented by Pentagon budget funds, and the final cost of launching this space vehicle turned out to be exactly 10 billion dollars. "Of the approximately 40 shuttle launchings planned before 1985, a third will be connected with military space projects," reported NEWSWEEK on 27 April 1981.

Washington is trying to justify its huge expenditures on military space programs with references to the alleged "Soviet military superiority in space." By resorting to propaganda ruses of this kind, the Pentagon hopes to carry out its long-range program for the militarization of space.

With the aid of the space shuttle, the United States plans to create military orbital stations, constantly manned by 10-14 individuals. These facilities are to be used as space-based command points and as reconnaissance stations for the observation of objects on land, in the air and in space. According to U.S. military experts, the orbital stations and shuttles will also serve as the basis for "inspection operations" with regard to foreign satellites or other objects in space.

The use of these space stations as bases for air defense and missile defense systems is given considerable attention in Pentagon plans. For this purpose, they are to be armed with radiation weapons, particularly chemical lasers and weapons using the charged particles produced by small-scale nuclear explosions. The American press has reported that U.S. laser weapons will be placed in outer space by the end of the current decade.

One important area of the military use of the space shuttle in the Pentagon's plans is the launching of "cheap" satellites for a variety of military purposes with the aid of the shuttle, including satellites intended to conduct combat operations in space. For example, so-called "space mines" (antisatellites filled with conventional explosives) and "killer satellites" for the destruction of space targets are to be placed in outer space.

These plans are part of the program for the attainment of the notorious military superiority to the USSR, although the illusory nature of these calculations has been apparent for a long time. After all, the Soviet Union is a strong power, capable of neutralizing any of Washington's attempts to achieve military strategic superiority.

It is also apparent, however, that the realization of Washington's military space ambitions, the militarization of outer space and its saturation with new weapons will lay the foundations for a new dangerous race for space weapons. This increases the danger of a global nuclear conflict, with all of the related terrible consequences for mankind.

The Soviet Union's new initiative to prevent the militarization of space and to turn it into a sphere of exclusively peaceful activity by states is a logical and sound step in the USSR's consistent efforts in this area.

The development of space travel, which began with the launching of the first Soviet satellite in 1957, has moved from purely scientific research to the practical stage. The use of space technology in such spheres as communications, navigation, meteorology and the study of the earth's natural resources has already benefited mankind greatly.

The Soviet Union has always participated energetically in the development of mutually beneficial cooperation by states in the exploration of space. Soviet scientists and experts generously share the results of their achievements in space with scientists and scientific institutions in other countries. This cooperation is carried out on a multilateral basis through UN channels and other international organizations, as well as with some states on a bilateral basis. The Soviet Union is distinguished by particularly active and varied cooperation with the socialist states, India and France in the study and use of outer space. Important research in space has been conducted on the Soviet Salyut space station and the Soyuz spaceships with international crews, where cosmonauts from nine socialist countries work with Soviet cosmonauts in accordance with the Interkosmos Program.

Each year new and broader opportunities arise for the exploration of space for scientific and constructive purposes. It is now particularly important to make every effort to keep activities in space from promoting militaristic and aggressive aims and to deliver peaceful space activity from peril.

The rapid development of space travel has faced the international community with the need to solve a number of legal problems connected with the activities of states in outer space, such as direct television broadcasting to foreign states and the satellite-aided observation of the earth's natural resources. The Soviet Union has advocated a fair solution to these problems in the interest of all states in the UN Committee on Space. The problem of setting the boundary between air and space has not been solved. The prohibition of the placement of any type of weapon in space would reinforce the political and legal fabric of the agreements regulating relations between states in the process of peaceful space research and would establish more favorable conditions for the conclusion of agreements on other legal problems in this sphere.

The Soviet proposal met with a widespread positive response from UN members. During the general political discussion at the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet proposal was supported by representatives from Afghanistan, Poland, the GDR, Indonesia, Bulgaria, Laos, Mongolia, the CSSR, Costa Rica, Hungary, Italy and other countries. "In view of the fact that the danger of the militarization of outer space is now acquiring tangible features," said Mongolian Foreign Minister M. Dugersuren, for example, "the Soviet Union's proposal that an international treaty be signed on the prohibition of the placement of weapons of any type in this new sphere of human activity is extremely pertinent." Lao Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Sipaseut stressed: "The Lao People's Democratic Republic is pleased to note that the Soviet delegation has suggested that the discussion of a treaty to prohibit the placement of weapons of any type in outer space be included in the agenda of this session of the General Assembly. This initiative is intended to limit the arms race in space." In the First (Political) Committee of the UN General Assembly, where the Soviet proposal was discussed, the idea of preventing the militarization of space was supported by representatives of Austria, Bangladesh and England. Only the American delegate

objected to the Soviet proposal. Speaking in the General Committee at the 36th session, he expressed "doubts about the need to discuss this matter in the United Nations."

After paving the way to the heavenly expanses for mankind, the Soviet Union is now offering a reasonable alternative to the race for space weapons and military rivalry in space. The implementation of the new Soviet proposal would not only prevent the militarization of space, but would also create favorable opportunities for future international cooperation in the study and use of space for peaceful purposes. The measures envisaged in the Soviet draft treaty are intended to establish greater trust in relations between states, especially relations between large states which have launched space vehicles. There is no question that the Soviet proposal is in the interest of all states, regardless of whether they participate directly in space research or enjoy the fruits of scientific and technical achievements in this sphere.

Space should not become the scene of an arms race and the source of friction between states. This is the main purpose of the Soviet proposal, which represents another concrete step toward the implementation of the program of peace for the 1980's, adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress.

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BOOK LOVERS FESTIVAL

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 73-75

[Article by N. N. Glagolev]

[Not translated by JPRS]

FRIENDLY FASCISM: THE NEW FACE OF POWER IN AMERICA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 76-90

[First installment of digest by V. I. Bogachev, prefaced by S. M. Zagladina, of book "Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America" by Bertram Gross, New York, M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1980]

[Not translated by JPRS]

STANDSTILL IN AMERICAN STEEL INDUSTRY

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[Article by A. S. Belorusov]

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CONSULTING IN CAPITALIST MANAGEMENT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 103-108

[Article by A. N. Isayenko]

[Text] In the present atmosphere of mounting economic difficulties, American firms have had to pay more attention to management problems. Virtually all large firms and federal agencies now have permanent divisions or groups of specialists working on these matters. In addition, an increasingly important role in the establishment of more efficient capitalist management is being played by outside consultants, who provide firms with the necessary expertise. According to the vice president of the Association of Consulting Engineers, the number of these consultants in business tripled between the mid-1960's and the end of the 1970's. The increase was even greater in civil service and, according to the data of the same association, it is now 4 times as high as the 1964 figure.¹

Management counseling dates back to the beginning of the century. That was when the first firms were established in the United States to offer assistance in the establishment of more efficient production and management. In 1910 there were only 15 such firms. Some of them specialized in management problems from the very beginning, but many of today's consulting organizations were once research engineering or accounting firms. For example, Arthur D. Little, which was founded in 1886 as a chemical laboratory, started investigating problems in management in 1910-1920 and then began to offer consulting services. Today it is, in addition to all of its other functions, the largest consulting firm: Management consulting accounts for around one-third of all its services. Arthur Andersen is an example of a consulting organization which grew out of an accounting firm. According to U.S. legislation, corporate accounts must be audited by outside experts. This led to the development of private accounting firms. By the very nature of their activity, these firms accumulated economic and administrative knowledge and acquired highly skilled personnel, information about their clientele and consulting experience. They mastered the new form of service by creating special consulting divisions.

The United States now has around 60,000 officially registered consultants. Around 40,000 work for managerial consulting and management engineering organizations and 8,000-10,000 work for accounting firms. There are also many firms consisting of a single consultant. In 1975 there were around 10,000 of these.² All consultants are members of professional associations. The largest are the Association of Consulting Management Engineers (ACME), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the Institute of Management Consultants (IMC).

In the United States the term consultant is used to denote individuals and organizations offering professional services on a commercial basis. They must be "independent."

American estimates of the number of organizations functioning as consultants cover a wide range, from 3,500 to 6,000. The minimum figure is the one cited by professional associations because they include only their members. Other estimates include organizations functioning actively as consultants but not registered with professional associations. They are called outsiders. The "Consultants and Consulting Organizations Directory," the fourth edition of which was published in 1979, was already listing 6,150 organizations at the end of the 1970's.

This figure does not include a number of research centers and advertising agencies, the subdivisions of some firms producing mathematical software for computers and administrative equipment, etc.³ For organizations of this type, consulting generally represents a form of activity which stimulates basic production and sales operations. In this case, consulting is something like the final stage in the process by which the firm's product reaches the consumer, whether the product is a new piece of technical equipment, research methodology or administrative theory. For example, when research organizations like the Planning Research Corporation assist in organizing the use of economic-mathematical methods in firms, they cease to be mere developers of new modeling methods for clients and enter directly into the managerial consulting sphere. In the late 1950's and 1960's, hundreds of organizations were founded in the United States for the development of new research methods and decision-making procedures. These "mathematized" research organizations, or "think tanks," include the well-known RAND and BDM (Braddock, Dunn and McDonald).

Firms producing computer equipment are starting to play an important role in management consulting. During the first stages this role consists only in conveying the firm's product to the consumer with the aid of the most diverse, often extremely complex organizational forms. For example, Gemini Computers Systems, an American transnational company operating in Western Europe, initiated the creation of joint enterprises with three large Dutch companies (chemical, insurance and postal) expressly for the purpose of filling the partners' needs for managerial information systems.

In the 1970's "executive search firms" became popular in the United States. According to American experts, in addition to suggesting organizational changes, large consulting firms often recommend the appropriate specialists for new positions. Gradually the executive search function was turned over to the consulting divisions of firms or to specialized firms, which already number in the hundreds. The firms vary in size from small family businesses, such as the well-known Snelling & Snelling, to extremely large ones with a diversified network throughout the nation, such as National Personnel Associates. To date, the latter has found around 600,000 executives for jobs in business.

Industrial companies also offer various types of consulting services. They are offered by General Electric, TRW, Lockheed and many others. The Xerox Corporation performs these functions within its teaching systems division. The company reports that 357 of the 500 largest corporations and many other firms have already made use of the division's services. Actually, the consultants in these organizations simultaneously perform advertising functions.

In a number of cases, new forms of consulting services have been offered for purely speculative purposes. For example, in 1971 the Westinghouse Corporation established a division for "public administration services." The firm received its first large contract from the United States Post Office for a sum of 700,000 dollars. The division promised to recommend ways of improving the work of the postal service by means of managerial efficiency. However, this hastily formed subunit had neither consulting experience nor enough qualified specialists. The Westinghouse incident was investigated as an example of inefficiency and mismanagement in the consulting sphere during special congressional hearings in 1977.⁴

Scales and Fields of Expertise

The intensification of social division of labor in the United States has turned consulting into a business with new knowledge and practical managerial skills for sale. The more intense division of labor in administration is an economical measure because it reduces the need for specialists and, to some degree, guards against the "petrification" of the bureaucratic organization in private business and in government. According to the findings of surveys conducted in state government agencies, the need to limit the growth of the personnel staff is the most important reason for using consultants in government. Other important considerations are the need for an "independent" evaluation and the possibility of training agency personnel while the consultants are at work.

The chief significance of the development of the consulting business, however, consists in the acceleration of innovative processes in capitalist management. Consulting promotes the quicker incorporation of new organizational decisions and scientific and technical achievements in managerial practice.

The activities of the first consulting firms included the organization of employee functions with a view to the theoretical and practical conclusions of the then new movement for "scientific management." In this way, even the first scientific theories of management were taken up by consultants and became more widely known. By the 1950's consulting extended to all basic administrative functions. It was at that time that large corporations began to use consultants on a much broader scale. The decisive factors in this process were new trends in corporate management, particularly in connection with the mass diversification of industrial companies, which required new organizational forms and methods of management.

New methods of scientific analysis were developed in the 1960's and were accompanied by new types of consulting services--research based on systems methodology and economic-mathematical methods. It proved effective in many spheres of management, from the compilation of government programs to virtually all traditional managerial functions in firms. However, consultants acquired the new administrative knowledge after research organizations, and these organizations then began to enter the consulting service market. In the 1960's and, in particular, in the 1970's, the birth of new information technology had the greatest influence on the development of managerial consulting. Firms and government agencies made the transfer to administrative information systems with the aid of consultants from firms producing computers and mathematical software, and later from accounting firms, beginning with the development of salary accounting information systems. Later the conventional consulting firms also became involved in this work.

Consulting extended to questions connected with the choice of computer equipment and mathematical software, the organization of computer operations, the establishment of more efficient flows of information, the formulation of economic-mathematical problems and the organization of decision-making processes with the aid of information systems.

The types of consulting services offered by leading firms in recent years serve as a reliable indicator of the particular managerial innovations that will be used widely in American business within a few years. At the turn of the decade more consulting services were offered in connection with the use of energy raw materials and means of transport. Other rapidly growing services are the compilation of long-range corporate development programs ("strategic planning") and the introduction of "strategic management" methods. In essence, "strategic planning" consists in the choice of corporate growth priorities and their financing by means of the centralized (on the level of the entire firm) redistribution of investments. The Boston Consulting Group, a firm founded in 1963 and specializing in this type of service, increased its income by 135 percent between 1977 and 1980--from 17 million dollars to 40 million. On the whole, however, the volume of these consulting services increases by 70 percent each year. On the basis of this, we can expect "strategic planning" methods to be used widely in American business in the 1980's.

The directory of consultants lists around 140 fields of specialization by subject matter and sector. Many consulting firms specialize not only in a specific managerial problem or function, but even in part of a function. Within the sphere of personnel management, for example, there are firms concerned with the compilation of job descriptions for managers (Henry Golayn), the use of certain socio-psychological methods of management (Scientific Methods Inc.), employee evaluations (Assessment Designs Inc.) and so forth. In the past, it was difficult to determine the chief function among the several dozen types of services offered by large consultants. In recent years, even the largest consulting firms have begun to specialize. Now Arthur Andersen specializes primarily in questions connected with the financial activity of enterprises and information technology. Booz Allen & Hamilton is the leader in personnel management problems, including executive search functions. Hay Associates also specializes in personnel management but it performs most of its services abroad. McKinsey, which became the model universal consultant, is concentrating on long-range corporate planning, and this is even more true of Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. and the Boston Consulting Group. Towers Perrin Forster & Crosby specializes in salary and pension problems. A. T. Kearney counsels firms mainly on transportation problems and bankruptcy.

Most of the problems requiring the assistance of a consultant are fairly common to the majority of industries. Common methods of analysis can be used in various spheres of public administration. For example, several of the "brain trusts" established by the Pentagon are now working actively for civilian agencies. For example, RAND was contracted to manage an experimental program of the Department of Health and Human Services over the next 10 years. The main clients of the Booz Allen & Hamilton consulting firm in recent years have included the Department of Labor and NASA. But BUSINESS WEEK magazine, the organ of the American business community, has directed special attention to the tendency toward specialization, stressing that this is the distinctive feature of the present stage in the development of the management consulting business and that it has "revitalized the consulting business and brought about its reorganization."⁵

The Organization of the Consulting Business

The consulting business cannot be regarded simply as a connecting link between the science of administration and the practice of capitalist economic management. There have been many cases in which consultants have played an active part in the dissemination and the development of new forms and methods of management. The proximity of consultants to the "production" of new managerial theories gives them great advantages, particularly in the amount of time required to master managerial innovations, which has a significant effect on the rate of scientific and technical progress. The consultant's role is most important during the initial stage of the mastery of new methods, when the majority of clients do not have the necessary knowledge, specialists or experience.

What is the basis of the advantages of consultants, which allow them to play such a significant role in management? Above all, it is specialization combined with a comprehensive approach to the analysis of problems; the accumulation of abundant factual material, as a result of which fairly typical situations and the methods of their analysis can be categorized, generalized and singled out; the relative independence of outside experts; the existence of a carefully chosen staff of highly qualified specialists. Most professional consulting organizations employ highly qualified specialists. They are hired on the basis of educational background (they often must have a doctorate), practical experience (usually at least 5 years) and personal qualifications, the most highly valued of which include, for example, success in interpersonal relations and the ability to persuade other people. To complete assignments on schedule, consulting firms often resort to a longer work day and other ways of intensifying the labor of their personnel. For example, ABT Associates uses a sliding schedule in which consultants alternately work 12 hours and rest 4 hours for several days.⁶ But the main factor guaranteeing the maximum output of specialists working on complex problems with a short deadline is the internal organization of the firm--from the overall organizational structure of the firm to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to creativity--as well as accumulated experience in the resolution of similar problems and a knowledge of the peculiarities of client conditions. The project and matrix structures are prevalent in administrative practice in consulting firms; these allow for the rapid reorganization of work in accordance with new projects and the problems arising during this process by uniting specialists from various functional subdivisions in temporary project groups. These groups are often formed on a voluntary basis according to the interests of researchers and consultants. For example, despite the huge size of the Arthur D. Little company (in 1976 it employed 1,052 professional consultants, working in 36 different fields), all operational work is conducted with the aid of task forces, created on a temporary basis to work on specific contracts. The selection of projects, the appointment of administrators and all general administrative affairs are the responsibility of a special committee of ten members, only four of whom are permanent. The members of task forces are chosen by the group leader (often the initiator of the project), who is responsible for the financing and scheduling of the work. Furthermore, Arthur D. Little's researchers can work on several projects simultaneously. In the 1970's the role of the largest consulting firms and the monopolization of this business constantly grew. Now the 15 largest companies (less than 0.5 percent of the total) account for a combined service volume of around 1 billion dollars and control a third of the market.⁷

In recent decades the management consulting business has become the focus of government regulation. In the first place, during different periods the government has encouraged its employees to use the services of private consulting firms. At first, when the government signed contracts with private firms according to the "cost plus profit" formula, consulting expenses were included in production costs but were not included in company profits. For this reason, as A. Hunt writes, "when industrialists earned steady extra profits from the improvements instituted by consultants, they made full use of these advantages while they were largely financed by the federal government."⁸ Then the government began to finance the services of consultants directly in some cases, using them to analyze the state of the economy in various sectors. For example, in 1979 the Department of Commerce hired the Kurt Solomon Associates firm to study overseas textile markets for the purpose of expanding sales of American goods. In another case it established a special fund of 10 million dollars to pay for consultants assisting the American footwear industry, which was experiencing a chronic crisis. In the second place, as we have already noted, the government actually initiated the creation of "mathematized" research organizations, which then became an important source of new consulting services. In the third place, various phenomena accompanying government economic regulation become the focus of consulting activity. Services connected with assisting business in its adaptation to government regulation in the areas of energy, transportation, taxation, pension security and environmental protection began to play a particularly important role in the 1970's. Hundreds of legislative acts in each of these areas and the new restrictions and opportunities they represent to the business community require the rapid reorganization of work in the appropriate company subdivisions, and even the largest firms cannot always cope with all of this on their own. In the fourth place, and this is the most important consideration, the government is directly influencing the management consulting business as the largest consumer of consulting services. In the middle of 1977 the results of a study of 64 government agencies (that is, not all of them) by the Office of Management and Budget revealed the existence of just under 34,000 consulting agreements and contracts worth 1.8 billion dollars.⁹ A significant percentage of these expenditures is accounted for by semigovernmental research centers. For example, more than 98 percent of the BDM Corporation's income comes from the federal government. This amounts to more than 30 million dollars a year. The RAND Corporation receives 91 percent of its income from the federal government and another 2 percent from local government agencies. This also includes the fees of university instructors and other non-professional consultants contracted by government agencies. Professional consultants account for a high percentage of contracts, however. Furthermore, particularly close ties have been established between the federal government and the largest consulting firms. For example, up to 30 percent of the income of Booz Allen & Hamilton comes from federal government contracts (it was only in recent years that the percentage was considerably reduced at the firm's own initiative), with respective figures of 20 percent for Arthur D. Little and 12-15 percent for Peat Marwick Mitchell. Individuals representing the administration of the largest firms are members of various consultative councils and committees on the government level, including the president's Council on Public Administration.

Therefore, outside consulting services have become one of the main sources of managerial improvement on the scale of the entire American economy in recent decades. They are performing this function at a time when there are no centralized

forms of publicizing new methods and managerial experience. On the whole, the management consulting business is developing fairly quickly. At the end of the 1970's the growth rate of consulting services was 15 percent a year. Nevertheless, experience has shown that the consulting business, just as any other, is subject, under the conditions of an unplanned economy, to cyclical fluctuations and is developing unevenly and in extremely contradictory forms under the influence of the laws of competition.

FOOTNOTES

1. BUSINESS WEEK, 21 May 1979, p 99; A. Hunt, "The Management Consultant," New York, 1977, p 46.
2. A. Hunt, Op. cit., p 23.
3. "Consultants and Consulting Organizations Directory," Detroit, 1973, p V.
4. "Consultants and Contractors. A Survey of Government's Purchase of Outside Services," U.S. Senate, Washington, 1977, p 213.
5. BUSINESS WEEK, 21 May 1979, p 98a.
6. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, May-June 1979, p 221.
7. BUSINESS WEEK, 21 May 1979, p 101.
8. A. Hunt, Op. cit., p 16.
9. "Consultants and Contractors," p 9.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Kissinger Discredited

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 109-111

[Review by G. G. Kocharyants of book "Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia" by William Shawcross, London, 1979, 467 pages; and of article "The Literary Destruction of Henry Kissinger" by William Shawcross, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2 January 1981, pp 67-71]

[Not translated by JPRS]

Latest Arms Control Impact Statements

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 111-114

[Review by V. I. Kuznetsov of book "Fiscal Year 1981 Arms Control Impact Statements," Statements Submitted to the Congress by President Pursuant to Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Wash., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, X + 552 pages]

[Text] This report is the fifth one published since the passage of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act in 1975. As a report submitted by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on behalf of the President, it is primarily intended to assess the potential effects of major Defense Department programs and projects on U.S. policy in this sphere.

Although its compilers try to convey the impression that all possible viewpoints are examined, this is hardly a valid position. The report reflects an extremely tendentious approach and intention to understate or disregard the particular aspects of Defense Department programs and projects that indicate the obvious U.S. desire to acquire unilateral military advantages.

The report begins with an analysis of one of the largest and most important U.S. strategic programs of recent years, the MX program, on which the Pentagon is prepared to spend no less than 33.8 billion dollars (p 15). It is immediately apparent that it is given an extremely subjective appraisal. For example, although the authors realize that this program is associated with a definite risk

as far as stability is concerned, they nonetheless conclude that it is "non-provocative." They proceed from the assumption that, despite the considerable augmentation of the counterforce capabilities of American strategic nuclear forces as a result of the deployment of the MX system, the system will not guarantee the possibility of a "disarming preemptive strike" against the USSR because the Soviet Union will still have part of its ICBM's, as well as SLBM's and strategic aviation (p 25).

The next important group of questions concerns the naval strategic component. Considerable attention is devoted to the Trident programs. According to the report, seven submarines of this type are to be deployed by 1986, which will increase the number of missiles in this component by 12 percent and the number of warheads by 48 percent (p 74). Analysis also indicates that the deployment of the new generation of missiles, the Trident 2, will be the most destabilizing of these programs. With their substantial counterforce capabilities, a sufficiently large quantity of these missiles could begin having a significant effect on strategic stability by the beginning of the 1990's (p 97). Although the authors go on to admit that this will heighten the "probability of an accidental nuclear exchange" (p 105), they finally conclude that these programs could have a favorable effect on strategic stability when they start their discussion of the hypothetical capabilities of future means of control (p 109).

Cruise missiles are the focus of attention in the section on the air component of the "strategic triad." When the authors assess their potential effect on the strategic balance, they say that the addition of modern long-range cruise missiles to nuclear missile potential could be regarded as a U.S. attempt to broaden the sphere of strategic rivalry and is therefore inconsistent with the policy goal of limiting this rivalry (pp 137-138).

The authors try, however, to justify their planned deployment. The most valid argument is considered to be the "anticipated increase" in the number of Soviet strategic warheads, which will have to be compensated for by new weapon systems of higher quality, including cruise missiles. Another argument is also cited: The anticipated superiority to the USSR resulting from the development and deployment of cruise missiles in the United States, particularly aircraft-launching missiles, will give the United States "certain advantages" in future SALT negotiations (p 43). Although the authors admit that this buildup of U.S. strategic nuclear potential will lead to a "massive" control problem in the distant future (p 152), they contradict their own earlier statements and assert that the deployment of cruise missiles is intended to "deter rivalry" between the two great powers.

One of the most vague sections of the report is the one on "cosmic defense," and there is good reason for this. It contains analyses of programs pertaining to the development of various methods of destroying targets in orbit close to the earth, as well as the observation, patrol, evaluation, warning and tracking equipment needed to establish the antisatellite destructive capability that has recently been the object of much concern in the Pentagon.

The report mentions the U.S. interest in concluding an agreement with the USSR on matters of antisatellite defense. A discussion of the need for means of influencing the other side in the event that talks are broken off actually serves to justify the desire for unquestioned superiority in space (p 208).

The section on ABM programs states that the 1972 ABM treaty restrictions are still in force and that the United States is concentrating on eliminating "future strategic misunderstandings" (p 219). When the authors examine plans for the non-nuclear destruction of ballistic warheads, however, such as the development of high-power lasers, methods of low-altitude interception and so forth, they admit that these programs could lay the basis for the rapid deployment of new ABM systems (p 229). Naturally, these capabilities will certainly have a destabilizing effect and will contribute directly to the creation of "misunderstandings."

Much is said in the report about combat theater missile systems and sea-based cruise missiles. It is no coincidence that these weapon systems are examined together, as the land-based cruise missiles intended for placement in Europe and the sea-based cruise missiles are different models of the same Tomahawk missile.

When the authors discuss the role of the projected placement of these new, much more effective nuclear weapons in the European theater, they do not conceal the fact that this will indisputably strengthen the capabilities of U.S. and NATO nuclear forces and will make military targets on Soviet territory more vulnerable (p 244). Although they go on to assert that this kind of modernization will increase the allies' trust in the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" and thereby help to limit the spread of nuclear weapons among the NATO allies (p 249), the report clearly indicates another purpose: a change in the European balance of power in the United States' favor and an opportunity to exert pressure on the Soviet Union. Systems of this kind could be useful as a "trump card" in future negotiations.

A special section of the report examines the U.S. position on research in the area of chemical weapons and on the stockpiling of such weapons. According to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which is referred to in the report, the United States pledged not to initiate the use of chemical weapons in wartime but to keep these weapons for "purposes of deterrence" and "defense" (p 333). The American opinion in regard to a possible ban on chemical weapons, according to the report, is that the liquidation of stockpiles would entail considerable difficulties, as would inspections. According to estimates, it would take at least 10 years to execute the terms of this kind of treaty. Inspections conducted locally under independent international supervision would be an essential condition. According to the "most preferable scenario," the report says, the "need to deter" the USSR by means of chemical weapons will continue to be present until around 1995 (p 334). In this way, an attempt is made to rationalize the stubborn U.S. reluctance to reach an agreement on the prohibition of these dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

The report also contains an analysis of programs for the development of directed-energy weapons. In particular, the authors note that these weapons would have certain advantages over all existing weapon systems in combat against missiles, aircraft and space targets in the future (p 438). Although the authors say that the restriction in existing arms control agreements do not apply to these weapons, they nonetheless admit that their use for ABM purposes could be inconsistent with some of the commitments taken on by the United States in accordance with the ABM treaty (p 451), and they even admit that new technology, such as the creation of high-energy lasers, could complicate arms control and introduce confusion and instability into world and regional interrelations (p 455). Nonetheless, the

authors imply that these programs should not be subject to current restrictions because it would be difficult to predict their future impact.

This kind of "argument" is also set forth in other sections of the report. It is cause for serious worry. After all, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, established as a "peace agency" in 1961 to aid in the prevention of war and the alleviation of the weapon burden, initially conducted serious research in the area of arms control and disarmament. The agency's participation in the organization of negotiations which resulted in the signing of SALT I, the ABM treaty and other extremely important documents can also be entered on the positive side of its ledger. However, at the same time--and quite noticeably in recent years--the agency, reflecting the militaristic aims of aggressive U.S. circles, has actively defended their military preparations and opposed its own announced goals. The report for fiscal year 1981 is clear evidence of this.

Danger: Militarism in U.S. Politics, Economics and Ideology

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 p 114

[Review by A. I. Deykin of book "Opasnost': militarizm v politike, ekonomike i ideologii SSHA" by V. D. Pyadyshev, Moscow, Voyennizdat, 1981, 255 pages]

[Text] This recently published book is a continuation of an examination begun by the author in his numerous previous works to expose the constantly growing role of militarism in U.S. domestic and foreign policy. The author's intent is to "reveal the degree to which militarism has 'taken root' in the capitalist society and the broad opportunities it now has to influence the planning and implementation of the official leadership's policy and to halt the process of international detente" (pp 6-7).

The author cites numerous facts attesting to militarism's substantial effect on the policy of American ruling circles. Reminding his readers of the noteworthy but not very well-known fact that U.S. territory has increased 10-fold as a result of wars (p 43), the author reveals a disturbing tendency: The U.S. military is now striving more often to control foreign policy. It is precisely these militaristic forces, V. D. Pyadyshev illustrates, that are impeding, with some success, the normalization of Soviet-American relations and the development of international detente.

The reasons for the increasing strength of the military establishment are also revealed by the author of this interesting work. Many congressmen have an interest in defense contracts. Government decisions, Pyadyshev writes, are often dictated by the common class interests of U.S. legislators and generals. The military establishment and the groups associated with it maintain American public support for policy to their advantage with the aid of rabid anti-Soviet propaganda. The ideologists of militarism speak quite frankly, as V. D. Pyadyshev illustrates by quoting a prominent American journalist: "If there were no communist bloc, the military would have to invent one" (p 197). The press, radio and television are becoming an arena for statements by American militarists. The offensive from this arena is directed not only at the American public ("brainwashing") but also at countries of the socialist community for the purpose of "eroding socialism."

In connection with this, the militarists' alliances with Zionists and other anti-Soviet groups leading the anti-Soviet campaign in the United States appear quite natural.

Without underestimating the degree to which American militarism is imperiling the world, V. D. Pyadyshev draws the valid conclusion, from a dialectical analysis of the changes taking place in the international sphere and within the United States, that forces opposed to American imperialism will guarantee optimistic prospects for the future.

The Individual in America; Analysis of Values and Political Views

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81, pp 114-115

[Review by A. A. Kokoshin of book "Lichnost' v sovremennoy Amerike. Opyt analiza tsennostnykh i politicheskikh oriyentatsiy" by Yu. A. Zamoshkin, Moscow, Mysl', 1980, 248 pages]

[Text] This work by Yu. A. Zamoshkin is a monographic study of a little-researched topic in Soviet studies of American affairs. The book consists of two parts: The first is concerned with the historical roots and evolution of individualism and individual values in the United States and the second discusses the formation and dynamics of individual political views. This composition allows the author of the work to reveal the depth of the individual values which took shape decades ago and are still influencing the political thinking of various classes and strata in the American society today.

The author correctly notes that the conditions of the formation of individual values in America differ perceptibly from conditions in Europe, where centuries-old beliefs arising from feudal relations, the development of the state and the power of the church were reflected in the evolution of public opinion and the personality development of the individual during the period of capitalist development.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, bourgeois individualism, which was opposed to obsolete and reactionary forms of social relations and to feudalism, was primarily humanistic in focus and represented a significant step forward (pp 14-15).

In the 19th century the American individual's main aim in life became "personal success," "free from the external bonds of the traditional world." This kind of success was achieved through enterprise, through private capitalist activity. In the eyes of most Americans, it completely eclipsed, for example, the success derived from a career in government, which was of such great importance in the formation of individual values in various social strata in many European countries. For the overwhelming majority of Americans, success is associated with wealth, money is the measure of advancement in life (pp 17-19).

Zamoshkin shows that there were already variations of the individualistic model of behavior in various classes and social strata in the 19th century, particularly in the last quarter. The most greedy, cynical and exploitative variation developed within the monopolistic bourgeoisie. Within the working public, the individualistic model of behavior was often combined with a desire for unity, cooperation and a collective struggle against those possessing tremendous wealth.

The author of this work should be commended for his thorough investigation of the values of the petty bourgeoisie, which played an extremely significant role in the personality development of the individual, in social psychology and in the formation of many elements of the American political system and political culture.

The work contains a detailed analysis of the evolution of individual values under the influence of the development of state-monopoly capitalism. The author cogently discusses the crisis of traditional values, the growing "dissatisfaction" with individualism and the spread of social aberrations.

In the second half of the work, the author examines the traditional types of American political thinking--liberal and conservative. The analysis of these two currents serves Yu. A. Zamoshkin as a basis for an examination of the causes and symptoms of the crisis of neoliberalism and the development of the leftist radical philosophy in the United States. The problems of the individual in connection with the ideological and political situation in the United States in the 1970's are discussed in a separate chapter.

Unfortunately, the author pays less attention to the growth of rightist radical and ultra-rightist feelings in the American political mind--a phenomenon which acquired sharp outlines at the end of the 1970's.

Other interesting sections of the book are those in which the author explains why the old and widespread traditions of individualism and the petty bourgeois ideology with which a large portion of the working public has been infected, in combination with the purposeful policy of the financial oligarchy, are creating difficulties in the activities of American communists and are keeping the Communist Party of the United States of America from growing into a mass party.

The author examines the factors determining the organizational nature of the two main bourgeois parties in the United States, the Republican and Democratic Parties, and the reasons why they, in contrast to European bourgeois parties, do not have a complex internal hierarchy and discipline.

History of the U.S. Two-Party System

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81, pp 115-116

[Review by V. O. Pechatnov of book "Istoriya dvukhpartiynoy sistemy SShA (1789-1980)" By A. S. Manykin, Moscow, Izd-vo MGU, 1981, 283 pages]

[Text] The author examines the two-party system in the United States as a single interconnected mechanism which has its own internal laws but is nonetheless affected by the socioeconomic and political processes of American capitalism. The very fact that the author has combined all of the extensive and diverse historical materials covering the entire period of the United States' existence is greatly to his credit. The book will serve as a useful guide through the labyrinths of the history of the American political parties.

In a work of such broad scope and complex subject matter, it is not surprising that some sections of the work are more successful than others and some aspects of the topic are not explained as adequately as others.

Certain topics of particular interest are discussed in greater detail in the work: the interaction of parties within the framework of the two-party system and changes in their organizational structure and ideological doctrine. This author is the first Soviet writer to trace the lengthy process of the organizational development of the bourgeois parties and the complex reversals in the interparty and intraparty political struggle over such a long period of history. The author's attempt to determine the common tendencies in party interaction within the framework of the two-party system is quite productive from the standpoint of scientific methodology, although this extremely complex topic requires further analysis.

The author is quite concerned with revealing the class essence of the two-party system and its role in preserving the political dominion of the ruling class. Unfortunately, he pays less attention to the analysis of party policy, particularly in connection with the parties' changing bases of voter support. It is certainly regrettable that the author did not discuss the constitutional-legal and socio-economic factors contributing to the formation of the American two-party system in its specific national form, which still differs sharply from the two-party system in other capitalist countries.

Of course, a thorough and fundamental examination of all matters connected with the history of the American two-party system is not a job for one book or one researcher. Manykin's book is a necessary and significant step in this direction.

Kennedy Assassination: Crime Without Punishment

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 116-117

[Review by A. A. Arzumanov of book "Prestupleniye bez nakazaniya" by S. A. Losev and V. V. Petrusenko, Moscow, Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1981, 96 pages]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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AMERICAN BOURGEOIS HISTORIOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ITS EVOLUTION IN THE 1970'S

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 81 pp 118-127

[Article by S. I. Appatov]

[Text] The main criterion to be used here in assessing the views of scholars and the developmental tendencies in the study of history is the attitude of bourgeois researchers toward the fundamental question of the present day--the question of war and peace--as well as their views on peaceful coexistence, international detente and the future of Soviet-American relations.

A study of works by American historians and political scientists published in the 1970's testifies that the "structure" of American bourgeois historical analysis has not changed in general. Despite the apparent variety of views, there are still only three more or less clearly defined currents in the analysis of postwar international relations (which can conditionally be called "rightist," "leftist" and "centrist"), currents which unite representatives of conservative, liberal and leftist radical bourgeois historical analysis.¹

It is also significant, however, that the increasingly harsh foreign policy of the United States in the middle and, in particular, the second half of the 1970's and the attempts by American ruling circles to undermine international detente and aggravate relations with the Soviet Union have been reflected in specific ways in works by bourgeois researchers.

When we examine this phenomenon from the standpoint of historical analysis, we can agree with American scholar P. Steinfels' statement that the present intensification of conservative and neoconservative tendencies in American bourgeois science, and primarily in history and journalism, is the antithesis of the radicalism of the "New Left" historians and political scientists and the neorevisionist school in American bourgeois historical analysis.² It is not surprising that the neoconservative leaders include such odious figures as Z. Brzezinski, S. Huntington, I. Kristol, N. Podhoretz and others.

It is precisely these authors and persons sharing their views who set the tone for American bourgeois historical studies of the second half of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's. Brzezinski is still developing the rigid anti-Soviet, anti-detente ideas he expressed in several of the works he wrote in the second

half of the 1960's and the first half of the 1970's, works which are already known to the Soviet reader. He is still arguing that detente supposedly benefits only the socialist countries, is discussing the "Soviet military threat" to the West, is advocating the intensive buildup of U.S. and NATO military power and the achievement of military superiority by the West and is defending the policy of military and political rapprochement with China.³ A relatively new feature of Brzezinski's recent works is his increasing pessimism with regard to the future of "Atlantic relations" with the Western European allies and his acknowledgement that the "Atlantic structure" has been incapable of creating a monolithic bloc, "held together by fear of the Soviet menace," to keep the Soviet Union in permanent isolation. At the same time, the author defends his thesis about the unconditional "leading role" of the United States--in other words, American hegemony in Western military and economic blocs--despite all of the statements about "partnership," "balanced interests" and "trilateral cooperation."⁴

During Brzezinski's term as President Carter's national security adviser, it was he and other "hawk" scholars who engineered the political initiatives leading to the creation of the "rapid deployment force," the aggravation of the situation in the Persian Gulf zone as a result of the unprecedented buildup of American naval forces in this region, the escalation of the U.S. and NATO military budgets at the end of the 1970's and other similar measures.

Professor S. Huntington, an associate of Brzezinski's who co-authored a number of works with him in the 1960's, set forth certain ideas in his articles of the second half of the 1970's which subsequently lay at the basis of official U.S. foreign policy. For example, according to his line of reasoning, American-Soviet relations during the postwar period can be divided into "two eras": The period up to 1970 was the cold war era, followed by the short "transition stage" of detente in 1970-1973, and then by the second "era" from 1973 to the present time--the era of "balanced competition and cooperation." This approach depicts international detente as a coincidence, an intermediate phenomenon with no deep roots. Huntington argues the need to conduct "economic diplomacy" in relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries--that is, to employ commercial and technological contacts as a means of pressure and blackmail and an "effective instrument of American foreign policy."⁵

If we consider the fact that Huntington was one of the National Security Council's official consultants and Z. Brzezinski's closest adviser for several years, we can understand his ability to influence U.S. policy. It was he who initiated the ban on sales of drill bits, produced by Dresser Industries, to the Soviet Union in summer 1978 and augmented the list of strategic goods which could not be exported to the socialist countries.⁶

The views expressed in the last 5 or 6 years by such prominent researchers as W. Griffith and A. Rubinstein have also fit in with the abovementioned rigidly anti-Soviet and anti-detente concepts.⁷ Former Director R. Pfaltzgraff of the Institute of Foreign Policy Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, renowned as an advocate of "forceful" methods in politics, remained true to his convictions at the end of the 1970's. In the harsh tones of the notorious "Pennsylvania School" of historians and political scientists (R. Strausz-Hupe, J. Dougherty and others), he has demanded the buildup of NATO military strength in Western Europe and the quickest possible placement of new American missiles with nuclear warheads here

and has frightened the reader with his far-fetched statements that the "military balance is changing in favor of the Soviet Union."

It is interesting that in his criticism of the policy of detente pursued by the U.S. Government at the beginning of the 1970's, he draws the extremely accurate and valid conclusion that the "human rights" campaign that was pushed to the foreground of U.S. foreign policy by the Carter Administration was absolutely incompatible with the concept of detente and could not fail to aggravate American-Soviet relations.⁸ Although Pfaltzgraff agrees completely with this new direction in U.S. foreign policy, his analysis corroborates a view expressed in the world democratic press--that the "struggle for human rights" has nothing in common with altruism and is dictated by the calculated foreign policy aim of undermining international detente on a more or less noble pretext. Militant conservative W. Buckley, editor of NATIONAL REVIEW, expresses this view even more frankly.⁹

The president of the Atlantic Treaty Association and chairman of the notorious Committee on the Present Danger, E. Rostow, formerly the U.S. under secretary of state and now the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has made the feisty demand that the U.S. Government "restore the nuclear intimidation potential" which ensured, in his words, the nuclear superiority of the United States to the USSR "until around the middle or end of the 1960's." This is why he has attacked the SALT II treaty, which is incompatible with this goal.¹⁰

The quintessence of the belligerent attitudes and concepts discussed above can be found in an anthology of articles by prominent ultra-conservative authors with the demagogic title "Defending America."¹¹ Here Rostow seeks the "Soviet threat" to Western Europe "through the Near and Middle East"¹² and turns against the Nixon-Kissinger policy of 1972-1973. Researcher T. Draper from the Hudson Institute calls detente "futile appeasement" which supposedly "gives the United States nothing in return." The author advises the U.S. Government to exert constant military and economic pressure on the USSR.¹³ University of California (Berkeley) Professor G. Grossman recommends the use of U.S.-USSR foreign economic relations to extort political concessions.¹⁴ The direct use of the notorious "human rights issue" to "heighten the effectiveness" of U.S. foreign policy, undermine detente and extort political concessions from the Soviet Union is advised by R. Conquest from the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.¹⁵ Georgetown University Professor E. Luttwak, who is now one of President Reagan's advisers on foreign policy, sharply criticizes detente, calling it the main cause of centrifugal tendencies in NATO.¹⁶ It is indicative that Luttwak not only criticizes detente as such, but also takes up arms against its bourgeois liberal supporters in the United States, notably G. Kennan.¹⁷

The falsification of Soviet foreign policy and demands for political concessions in the foreign policy arena and domestic changes in the USSR can be found in the previously mentioned anthology in articles by University of California (Berkeley) Professor P. Seabury and Professor W. Thompson from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.¹⁸ Both are researchers with strictly conservative views who have been known for their works on postwar international relations since the beginning of the 1960's.

The military aspects of U.S. foreign policy are examined from the standpoint of criticism of detente and the need to escalate the arms race in works by Johns

Hopkins University Professor C. Marshall, University of Chicago Professor A. Wohlstetter and former assistant secretary of defense P. Nitze, one of E. Rostow's closest associates in the Committee on the Present Danger.¹⁹ Most of the authors listed above are official Pentagon or State Department advisers and experts and members of the influential Council on Foreign Relations (in New York). In other words, they represent the elite of bourgeois history and political science, who have always had a quite significant effect on foreign policymaking in the United States.

T. Stanley, former U.S. representative to NATO who later taught at a university and served as one of the heads of the Atlantic Council of the United States, was already arguing against international detente at the beginning of the 1970's. At the end of the decade he was calling detente a "new form" of tension (!?) and advising the maximum buildup of U.S. military efforts for this reason.²⁰ Prominent professor and expert on international affairs from Johns Hopkins University R. Tucker takes a pessimistic look at the results of the Carter Administration's foreign policy activity, criticizing it from the Right, and advises the new administration to take more decisive action in relations with the Soviet Union and begin an intensive buildup of American military strength.²¹ In the interest of U.S. foreign policy, Political Science Professor R. Wesson proposes the more energetic use of such methods of undermining the internal unity of the socialist community countries as the "technical factor" and non-traditional foreign policy instruments (technical and food assistance, achievements in world ocean and space research, electronic computer equipment, etc.).²²

Johns Hopkins Professor G. Liska, renowned American geopolitical expert and ideologist of the "American empire," is still a prolific conservative author with anti-Soviet and anticommunist views. His works of the second half of the 1970's are full of nostalgia for the lost influence of U.S. imperialism of the 1950's and a recognition of the need for American ruling circles to move toward a policy of equilibrium between allies and potential adversaries.²³

A group of retired generals and admirals (B. Holloway, T. Milton, M. Taylor, E. Zumwalt and B. Palmer) published a work entitled "Grand Strategy for the 1980's." This manifesto of the military-industrial complex quite frankly calls for an unrestrained arms race, the achievement of "unconditional" military superiority to the USSR, the expansion of forward based American forces in Europe, etc.²⁴ The same frankly aggressive tone can be found in a collection of reports by professors and instructors from the Institute of Strategic Studies of the U.S. Army War College. These authors call detente a "Russian trick" and assert that the only acceptable foreign policy strategy for the United States in relations with the USSR is military pressure and threats. The anthology contains only one more or less restrained and realistic article (by R. Sorley), which only emphasizes the overall background of the militaristic and chauvinistic slogans of the other authors.²⁵ Works published in these years by E. Zumwalt, A. Goodpaster and H. Cleveland also serve as a sounding board for the U.S. military-industrial complex.²⁶

The extensive "comparative study of U.S. and Soviet military potential," conducted by Library of Congress researcher J. Collins, has served as a falsified statistical base for the American "hawks" who have raised all the fuss about the imaginary U.S. military lag behind the USSR and the "vulnerability" of the United States to

a Soviet nuclear strike.²⁷ The "data" from this "study" are eagerly utilized by all of those who are striving to convince the Americans, by means of every possible fact and fiction, of the "growing Soviet threat."

Professor R. Osgood, the author of a number of works on U.S. foreign policy, returned to his analysis of the "lessons of Vietnam," but this time in an extremely offensive anti-Soviet tone, in the belief that public opinion in the United States has already recovered from the "Vietnam syndrome" and is ready for new foreign policy adventures.²⁸ B. Manning, who was once the president of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), programs the development of U.S. foreign policy in the "nation's third century" with a view to the intensive militarization of the country, the denigration of detente's impact and the buildup of U.S. military strength in Western Europe.²⁹

A misinterpretation of the very concept of "detente" is provided by an international group of researchers from the Trilateral Commission: University of Chicago Professor J. Azrael, Free University of Berlin Professor R. Lowenthal and former Japanese Ambassador to the USSR T. Nakagawa. The authors examine only one facet of detente: as leverage to strengthen the West's economic and military positions in the struggle against "world communism."³⁰ Harvard University Professor W. Laqueur proposes a "realistic" approach to detente but actually demotes it to the status of a smoke-screen for the internal demoralization of the socialist countries, he accuses the Carter Administration of being too weak and demands a tougher stand in relations with the Soviet Union and a stronger American military and political presence in Western Europe.³¹ The community of detente's belligerent detractors invariably includes famous American "Sovietologist" R. Pipes, professor of Russian History at Harvard University and National Security Council staff member, whose statements about the "Soviet threat" and numerous falsifications of Russian and Soviet history and Soviet foreign policy have been subjected to serious criticism by many Soviet historians and journalists.

When we analyze the works of ultra-conservative scholars of international affairs, we immediately notice an extremely indicative phenomenon of recent years: They have been joined by researchers who took a moderate stand within the framework of the conservative school of bourgeois historical analysis in the late 1960's and early 1970's (the period of the active development of international detente). This noticeable "rightward shift" in conservative historical analysis as a whole is particularly apparent when we analyze the works of former Secretary of State H. Kissinger, a historian and political scientist who is a prominent member of the academic and political elite of the United States.

Much has been written in the Western press about the "new Kissinger"³² in connection with his obviously more rigid views on detente, peace and peaceful coexistence in recent years and his negative attitude toward the ratification of the SALT II treaty, the American side of which can be regarded as his offspring in many respects. His renunciation of the policy of detente has been chalked up to anti-communist intentions connected with the Republican victory in the 1980 presidential election.³³ Many bourgeois press organs have given credence to this superficial approach to the evolution of Kissinger's views. A careful analysis of his foreign policy beliefs, however, beginning with his first publications in the mid-1950's,³⁴ indicates that this evolution has been a natural one. However odd it may seem at

first, the "early Kissinger" of the 1950's and the "later Kissinger" of the late 1970's and early 1980's differ little from one another. In fact, they are just as much alike as the periods of acute international tension in those same years. The essence of the foreign policy beliefs of Henry Kissinger, a typical pragmatic geopolitician and confirmed anticommunist, has essentially never changed. He supported detente when there was a noticeable shift in the balance of power, including the military balance, that was not in the United States' favor, at the time of the disgraceful failure of American imperialism's Vietnam adventure. This was a necessary position at that time and, to some degree, a politically speculative one, calculated to acquire unilateral advantages for the United States from detente.

The subsequent course of historical events in the 1970's, the growing scales of the revolutionary and liberation movement and the social consequences of international detente, especially in Western Europe, seriously alarmed Kissinger and his associates from among the so-called "political realists" of the moderate conservative school. This mood is more or less frankly discussed by Kissinger, who explains his "departure from detente" in his memoirs, the first volume of which was published in 1979.³⁵ Of course, the subjective ambitions of the former secretary of state cannot be completely disregarded, but we feel that there were deeper motives and reasons for the transformation of his views as a scholar and politician. The obvious shift in Kissinger's views on many political issues, from a position to the center to a conservative and pointedly anti-Soviet position, corresponds to the changing views on detente of much of the American establishment, frightened by the social consequences of detente on the global scale.

In this connection, the latest articles by S. Brown are also indicative. This renowned political scientist and military theorist was distinguished in the past for his sensible judgments and unbiased view of questions of war and peace but has recently proposed that detente be "shelved" indefinitely.

In spite of the noticeable overall rightward shift in the views of bourgeois historians and political scientists in the second half of the 1970's, the moderate wing of historians, which includes scholars with conservative and liberal views, has not completely lost its influence. Although this "center" now appears "eroded" and limited in terms of its number of members and publications, it still includes several distinguished bourgeois researchers of international relations. Although this group of bourgeois scholars pays court to the present wave of belligerent anti-Sovietism, it is also striving to swim against the current of quasi-official pro-American stereotypes.

The most prominent member of this group is Harvard University Professor Stanley Hoffmann, who has been renowned for many years in the United States and abroad as a major expert on the theory and history of postwar international relations. His books and articles of the last quarter-century have accurately reflected the political train of thought of the more moderate American scholars in the influential international school of "political realism." The researcher is still true to his conviction that the fate of the world depends primarily on the smooth course of American-Soviet relations³⁶ and advocates, although with a few stipulations, the continuation of detente and the "factions treatment" of military force as an element of foreign policy.³⁷ In a fundamental work on contemporary international relations, Hoffmann sets forth his idea of "world order," based on tolerance and

compromises by rival world powers. Amplifying the traditional views of the "political realists" on the maintenance of a "balance of power" in contemporary international relations, he nevertheless warns against the underestimation of detente, underscores its importance to the United States and realistically examines the social consequences of detente in the developing countries.³⁸

Two long articles published by S. Hoffmann in 1980 soon after the events in Iran and Afghanistan are extremely indicative of his views and the views of others like him.³⁹ In these articles he argues with the supporters of the "new orthodoxy" in the United States who employ the worst cold war stereotypes and believe that "any event in the world represents a test of American will and determination." He says that this line of thinking leads only to the elaboration of "implausible military scenarios presaging the coming of Judgment Day." The researcher argues with Brzezinski's extremist views on international relations and his underestimation of the role of American-Soviet relations among U.S. foreign policy priorities. Although the author was not particularly optimistic about the future development of Soviet-American relations in the beginning of the 1980's, describing them as a "mixture of rivalry and cooperation," he is certain that the USSR does not want "worldwide chaos" and supports a "balanced strategy." His recognition of the real possibility of mutually acceptable compromises in American-Soviet relations favorably distinguishes the views of this scholar from those of his many colleagues who are ultra-conservative "political realists."

The author's negative attitude toward the "human rights issue" as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy is interesting. He believes that the struggle for human rights is not a function of government bodies and government policy. "Peace," he writes, "is one of the human rights. Efforts in the area of human rights will have no chance for success unless there is stronger accord and communication between states."⁴⁰

The second of his articles, "Reflections on the Present Danger," was written at the height of the hysterical anti-Soviet campaign launched by the American media and inspired directly by the White House in connection with the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and the events in Iran. In this article Hoffmann appears to sympathize to some degree with this anti-Soviet campaign but does not lose his inherent sense of political realism. He suggests that the U.S. Government should be guided by facts, and not by emotions, when it assesses events. He poses certain important questions, even if only in rhetorical form: Is it possible that these actions by the USSR were a "limited defensive measure"? If so, should the United States have taken such resolute steps to undermine international detente? And so forth and so on.

Hoffmann believes that the United States should have stopped performing the functions of a "world policeman" and leader of the "holy worldwide anti-Soviet alliance" long ago, in spite of Beijing's urging. He feels that this is senseless and dangerous. Just as resolutely, he condemns the American administration's refusal to ratify the SALT II treaty, saying that the United States is "only punishing itself." The researcher warns U.S. ruling circles not to be tempted to view military strength as the deciding factor in foreign policy in the next few years, as this line of thinking, he stresses, "could involve the United States in precisely the same kind of war which overwhelmed us in Vietnam." The author's skeptical opinion of the

Camp David bargain and the separate Egyptian-Israeli treaty is also indicative. The author feels that the failure to consider a solution to the Palestinian question, as the central issue of Middle East regulation, or the role and participation of the Soviet Union in this matter was a nearsighted and ineffective policy which could only isolate the United States more from the Arab countries and strengthen anti-American feelings in the region.

The author expresses the same kind of sensible view in regard to America's unilateral support of Pakistan against Afghanistan and India. This, he points out, has already led to the significant convergence of Soviet and Indian state interests and the decline of American influence in India and has not changed the political situation in Afghanistan in the United States' favor. The author concludes his article with more criticism of the tendency of U.S. ruling circles to treat military strength as the chief way of overcoming existing difficulties in international relations. He then offers some extremely symptomatic advice to the American Government to "not lose sight of two simple facts: There is no replacement for peaceful coexistence in our time, and it can only be achieved if the Soviet Union is not put in the position of total hostility."⁴¹

We have examined Hoffmann's views in detail because they reflect, to one degree or another, the position of a group of experts on international affairs which is small at the present time but holds a distinguished place in the academic community. The group includes M. Shulman, A. Schlesinger, Jr., L. Hall, L. Gelb, E. Ravenal, R. Legvold, R. Rosecrance and others. Columbia University Professor M. Shulman, who served as the U.S. secretary of state's special adviser on Soviet affairs in the Carter Administration, has consistently advocated smooth American-Soviet relations, opposed the affliction of the "chauvinistic syndrome" in U.S. foreign policy and supported the ratification of the SALT II treaty and the continuation of detente, although at a more "moderate" speed.⁴² Shulman disagreed with the tendency of the U.S. Government in general and Brzezinski in particular to underestimate the importance of American-Soviet relations and feels that "absolute military superiority" to the USSR is not a sensible goal. According to Shulman, this policy will simply lead to a new round in the arms race (and this has been corroborated--S. A.) and will not provide any additional guarantees of strong U.S. national security.⁴³

It is extremely indicative that University of Chicago Professor Hans Morgenthau, the acknowledged dean of the school of "political realism" and an eminent theorist, political scientist and expert on international affairs, also retained his "centrist" views until his death in July 1980. When this patriarch of American historical studies of international affairs and political science participated in a discussion of U.S. foreign policy conducted by the American Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, he advocated the preservation of international detente and the accomplishment of nuclear disarmament, saying that all of this would be purely in the American interest. He called detente "the only prerequisite for the survival of the United States and the USSR." He underscored the primary significance of American-Soviet relations, and not "North-South" relations (as Brzezinski maintained), for the guarantee of peace and international security. When the "Carter Doctrine" and the idea of the "reideologization" of U.S. foreign policy reached the height of their popularity, the distinguished bourgeois theorist of international affairs said that the human rights issue "cannot be the basis of a serious foreign policy."⁴⁴ Not long before his death, in spring 1980,

Morgenthau said in a newspaper interview that U.S. foreign policy had been reduced to a pitiful state by the inconsistent and ambiguous policy line of the American administration.⁴⁵

The wave of anti-Soviet and anticommunist hysteria, belligerent nationalism and militaristic fever has noticeably weakened the so-called leftist, liberal-radical wing of American bourgeois historians. Books and articles which pointedly criticize the aggressive, provocative nature of U.S. foreign policy and its inherent expansionism, hegemonism and imperial tendencies, which were so characteristic of a large group of authors in the 1960's, have become relatively rare. The wave of criticism by the "New Left" historians and journalists and several representatives of the "neorevisionist school," which was characteristic of the 1960's and early 1970's and was connected primarily with more or less harsh criticism of the cold war policy pursued by U.S. ruling circles in the 1950's and 1960's, had obviously lost momentum by the mid-1970's. Most of the representatives of this current of bourgeois political thought were successfully integrated in the community of official historical studies of international relations, taking a place slightly "left of center."

This is particularly striking, for example, when we analyze the works of Richard Barnet, the director of the Political Research Institute in Washington, who was famous in the mid-1960's for his harsh criticism of the cold war policy, of American expansionism and direct U.S. intervention in Asia and Latin America, of the activities of multinational corporations, etc.⁴⁶ In the second half of the 1970's Barnet gave in somewhat to the wave of militarism, belligerent anti-Sovietism and anticommunism and has noticeably lost his passion for tirades against the foreign policy of postwar American administrations. This is quite apparent in his book "The Giants: Russia and America" and his subsequent article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS on American-Soviet relations.⁴⁷ In these works, as well as in subsequent newspaper articles written in 1979 and 1980, Barnet adheres loyally to his previous beliefs regarding the desirability of, and necessity for, international detente, effective talks on disarmament and businesslike American-Soviet dialogue. His view of the causes of international tension is obviously changing, however, beginning with the first years of the cold war and ending with the present day. He tries to divide the blame for this tension between the United States and the USSR and ascribes past and present Soviet foreign policy certain features which are alien to it: expansionism, imperial globalist tendencies, etc. Although these falsifications are accompanied by similar complaints about U.S. foreign policy, lies are lies.... This kind of objectivist thinking is also characteristic of a generally interesting work by Brookings Institution Professors M. Berkowitz, P. Bock and V. Fuccillo, in which they analyze the "social context of foreign policy decision making" in the United States.⁴⁸

Despite the definite abatement of the wave of criticism, some fundamental studies by prominent researchers who have remained loyal to the anti-war, realistic traditions of the 1960's were also published in the late 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's. The most interesting is an anthology entitled "Detente or Debacle," compiled by the American Committee for East-West Accord and edited by F. Neal, a University of California professor who is known in the United States as a supporter of peaceful coexistence and friendly American-Soviet relations.⁴⁹ The authors of the articles in this book include such prominent American scholars and public

spokesmen as W. Fulbright, G. Kennan, J. Galbraith, G. Kistiakowsky, D. Riesman, Princeton University Professor S. Cohen and renowned American expert on international law S. Pisar. The authors condemn the feisty, provocative foreign policy behavior of the U.S. administration, which poses a threat to world peace, and the rhetoric and actions intended to undermine detente. They unanimously favor the alignment and subsequent improvement of American-Soviet relations and the ratification of the SALT II treaty and they see no alternative to detente, although they certainly do not see it as a balance of U.S. and Soviet interests. Although they acknowledge that competition and rivalry between the two greatest powers on earth are inevitable, they do not dramatize this fact, but examine it within the context of "reasonable and businesslike compromises"--in other words, essentially from the standpoint of peaceful coexistence.

Opinions of this type have been expressed in the last 5 years in a number of books and magazine and newspaper articles by former ambassador and renowned American expert on international affairs George Kennan,⁵⁰ the abovementioned Professor F. Neal, chairman of the Committee on American-Soviet Relations,⁵¹ and distinguished American politician and diplomat A. Harriman.

The former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, W. Fulbright, the author of several books and numerous magazine and newspaper articles, resolutely supports the continuation of detente and the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations and opposes the perpetuation of cold war. He writes that there have been "two schools of thought" for more than 30 years in the field of international affairs and, in particular, Soviet-American relations. One is the cold war school and the other is the detente school. Fulbright calls himself a confirmed supporter of the second school. He is certain that the United States and Soviet Union can "cooperate successfully in trade, control over disarmament and the containment of regional conflicts."⁵²

In the foreword to a book by some famous American scholars from the so-called "Boston Research Group," who criticize the U.S. military-industrial complex for the unnecessary, dangerous and senseless arms race, Fulbright fully approves of their demands for sharp cuts in the U.S. defense budget and the use of military appropriations for peaceful purposes and asks the reader not to confuse American propaganda myths with the truth about contemporary international relations.⁵³ In a CHICAGO TRIBUNE interview in the beginning of 1980, at the height of the anti-Soviet and anti-Afghan hysteria, Fulbright sharply criticized the Carter Administration's militaristic foreign policy and displayed some understanding of the Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan, describing them as a "defensive move" and not an "attempt to establish strong positions in the Persian Gulf zone."⁵⁴ In terms of political orientation, the works of Harvard University Professor D. Yergin, a young "neorevisionist" historian, are in accord with the studies listed above.⁵⁵

An in-depth analysis of the evolution of American bourgeois historical studies of international relations provides a better understanding of the process of U.S. foreign policymaking and reveals the deep-seated processes taking place in bourgeois historical and political science in general.

FOOTNOTES

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